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employment decisions, should an employer be held liable for
discriminatory results when it fails to adopt such measures? Given the
vast amount we now know about implicit bias and the ways to reduce
it, to what extent is an employer who knowingly fails to do so engaging
in intentional discrimination? This Article theorizes a "recklessness"
model ofdiscrimination under Title VII, arguing for liability where an
employer acts with reckless disregard for the consequences of implicit
bias and stereotyping in employment decisions. Legal scholars have
argued that Title VII should, and in some ways does, reflect a
negligence model under which an employer may be held liable for
failing to meet a duty ofcare to prevent discrimination at work. Yet the
law of Title VII disparate treatment requires "intentional"
discrimination-a term that courts have interpreted more broadly than
a conscious purpose to discriminate, but more narrowly than a mere
failure to prevent "societal" discrimination. This Article is the first to
propose recklessness as the bridge between the theory of negligence
and the requirement of intent as defined by Title VII jurisprudence.
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z388P5V86M
Copyright 0 2017 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. For their helpful
comments and questions on presentations or drafts of this article, my sincere thanks to Adrienne Davis,
Nancy Dowd, Michael Green, Tristin Green, Darren Hutchinson, Marcia McCormick, Rachel Moran,
Elizabeth Pendo, Nicole Porter, David Oppenheimer, Wendy Parker, Sharon Rush, Joseph Seiner, Reva
Siegel, Sandra Sperino, Amy Stein, Stacey Steinberg, Charles Sullivan, and Mary Ziegler. My thanks
as well to the participants in the 2016 SEALS Annual Conference Workplace Law Works-in-Progress
Program, the 2016 Southeastern Junior-Senior Scholars Workshop, the 2017 American Constitution
Society's Junior Scholars Public Law Workshop, and a faculty workshop at Florida State University
College of Law. Thanks, too, to Christopher Shand, Marisol Silva, Meredith Jones, and Avery Le for
their excellent research assistance.
1055
CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW
In doing so, the Article seeks to revive the importance of social
science research on bias-research that was limited in its evidentiary
role by the U.S. Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.
Decades ofscientific research have documented how implicit bias and
automatic stereotyping affect decision making in discriminatory ways.
Years of efforts by employers to reduce bias and increase diversity in
their workforces have demonstrated what interventions work. Most
recently, technology has allowed some employers to easily and
dramatically reduce the biasing effects of subjectivity from their hiring
decisions by, for example, using algorithms instead ofpeople to screen
applicants. This vast body of research and experience developed over
a half-century has shifted the baseline knowledge about the risks of
bias infecting employment decisions, this Article contends. Today, an
employer who continues to rely on unchecked subjective decision
making that leads to disproportionate employment outcomes by race
or gender is acting so recklessly that its behavior amounts to
intentional disparate treatment under Title VII.
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, economists Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rouse
documented perhaps the most well-known example of how biases can infect
subjective performance assessments despite decision makers' efforts to be
objective.' Prior to the 1970s, most major American symphony orchestras were
composed overwhelmingly of male musicians. 2 In the 1970s and 1980s, many
orchestras began using a blind audition process, whereby musicians performed
behind a screen that concealed the auditioning musician's identity. 3 Goldin and
Rouse documented that, due in part to the blind audition process, the proportion
of female members of the top five U.S. orchestras increased from 5 percent to 25
percent.4 They also showed that a female musician was 50 percent more likely
to get further in the audition process when orchestras used a blinding screen.5
Most commentators raise this well-worn example 6 for its vivid illustration
of the phenomenon of "implicit bias" (also known as "cognitive" or
"unconscious" bias), whereby ingrained attitudes about sex, race, or another
status characteristic impact perceptions of performance despite decision makers'
beliefs that they are unbiased.7 This Article offers the orchestra example to make
two further points. First, the audition blinding screen illustrates-concretely in
fact-how a simple, inexpensive tool helped an employer interrupt or block its
decision makers' unrecognized biases to select those most qualified. Second,
this research by respected Harvard and Princeton economists is twenty years old.
Two decades have passed since Goldin and Rouse documented both a clear
example of the problem of implicit bias in discretionary decision making and one
easy solution to reduce its impact. Yet employment discrimination jurisprudence
has failed to appropriately incorporate this understanding.
1. See generally Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of
"Blind" Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AMER. ECON. REv. 715 (2000) (describing orchestra
auditions study); Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind"
Auditions on Female Musicians, (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5903, 1997)
(same), http://www.nber.org/papers/w5903.pdf [https://penna.cc/SNC7-ZHVU]. This example has
been cited by not only numerous scholars, see infra note 6, but also by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
her dissent in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. See 564 U.S. 338, 372 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2. See Goldin & Rouse, AMER. ECONOMIC REV., supra note 1, at 717-18.
3. See id. at 715-16.
4. See Goldin & Rouse, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, supra note 1, at 1; Goldin & Rouse,
AMER. ECONOMIC REV., supra note 1, at 717-18, 738 & n.37.
5. Goldin & Rouse, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, supra note 1, at 1; Goldin & Rouse,
AMER. ECONOMIC REV., supra note 1, at 738.
6. In January 2017, a Google Scholar search returned over one thousand citations to the study.
7. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 969 (2006) (defining implicit bias and its role in law).
8. See Joan C. Williams, Hacking Tech's Diversity Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/10/hacking-techs-diversity-problem [https://perma.cc/9vYQ-XGLC]; Bias
Interrupters, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, http://worklifelaw.org/bias-internupters
[https://perma.cc/LHT6-QLPL] (last visited Apr. 14, 2017); Assessing Performance and Potential, CTR.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP, http://gender.stanford.edu/assessing-
performance-and-potential [https://perma.cc/BB5D-DEXD] (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
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If, in 2017, an orchestra knowingly chooses not to use a blinding screen for
auditions and the result is disproportionately fewer female musicians selected for
hire, is that intentional discrimination? The orchestra may not have intended to
exclude female musicians, but it acted with what, at this point in time, can only
be described as reckless disregard for the consequences of its choice to rely on a
decision-making structure long-known to foster bias, while ignoring a relatively
costless bias-reducing measure.
Consider the panoply of "blinding screens" that modem technology offers
today. Modeling itself on the popular competition television show The Voice (the
2017 version of blind auditions for orchestras), start-up company GapJumpers
provides a technology platform through which employers can hold "blind
audition challenges" online, which testjob applicants' relevant skills.9 The desire
to remove implicit bias from hiring in the technology sector has sparked a cottage
industry to help employers do so, through blind interviews over online instant
messaging software, application-screening algorithms, pre-commitment to set
assessment standards, and more. 10 Researchers have developed tools for
employers to spot and correct for unexamined biases throughout the employment
relationship-from setting compensation to evaluating work performance to
awarding promotions." The ability to prevent and correct for bias and
stereotyping in the workplace is more affordable and accessible than ever before.
To what degree do employers behave in an intentionally discriminatory way
when they ignore both the well-known risks of implicit bias in employment
decisions and accessible, affordable techniques to help prevent it?
In the fifty years since Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 first
prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national
origin, and religion,12 societal understanding of how bias perpetuates inequality
at work has advanced exponentially.' 3 Decades of research by contemporaries of
Goldin and Rouse in the fields of economics, sociology, social psychology,
neuroscience, and more have created a deep body of scientific work on which
our current understanding is based.1 4 For several decades now, even prominent
employers have recognized the costs of more subtle and structural inequality to
their operations, leading many to voluntarily adopt and experiment with
interventions.15  Business interest in this research inspired corporate
9. See Marianne Cooper, The False Promise of Meritocracy, ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/meritocracy/418074 [https://perma.cc/P4S9-
QL8R]; Discover Great Talent "The Voice" Way, GAPJUMPERS, https://www.gapjumpers.me
[https://perma.cc/PN68-DZW5] (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
10. See infra Part E.B.2.
11. See id.
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e etseq. (2012)).
13. See infra Part 11.B.1.
14. See id.
15. See infra Part 111.B.2.
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commitments to diversity and expanded the field of human resources.-" The
technology sector has also radically reshaped this field by making tools to
prevent and reduce bias in employment decision making readily available.17 Yet
while Title VII provides a flexible statutory framework that would allow it to
adapt to such advances, employment discrimination jurisprudence has failed to
keep up. Where the federal courts' application and interpretation of Title VII
once led the way toward employment equality for women and minorities, it has
now fallen behind, failing to adapt the doctrine to recognize what society and
employers already understand.
This Article offers a path forward by theorizing a "recklessness" model of
discrimination under Title VII, arguing for liability where an employer acts with
reckless disregard for the consequences of implicit bias and stereotyping in
employment decisions. Legal scholars have argued that Title VII should-and,
under some legal theories like harassment and accommodation, does-reflect a
negligence model of liability that holds an employer liable for failing to meet its
statutory duty of care to prevent discrimination.' 8 Yet most Title VII cases are
pled using the disparate treatment theory of liability, which courts have
interpreted to require proof of "intentional" discrimination.19 The meaning of
"intent" under Title VII is, itself, unclear: courts have interpreted it more broadly
than animus or a conscious purpose to discriminate, but more narrowly than a
mere failure to prevent "societal" discrimination from affecting the workplace.20
This Article is the first to propose recklessness as the bridge between the theory
of negligence and the requirement of intent as defined by Title VII jurisprudence.
In doing so, the Article also aims to salvage the legal role of social science
research on implicit bias and stereotyping-research that the Supreme Court held
had limited evidentiary value in the Court's 2011 decision in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes.2 1 Six decades of scientific research has documented that people hold
stereotypes and biases that they may act on automatically, without conscious
awareness or discriminatory motive. 22 Though implicit biases are automatic,
research also shows that there are known interventions to control or interrupt
them, some of which employers have been using for years.23 And, while this
research may not provide evidence that an individual decision maker acted on
implicit bias when making a particular employment decision, it does provide a
general background upon which to judge the employer entity responsible for that
16. See generally FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2009) (documenting the
role of personnel professionals in putting antidiscrimination law into practice).
17. See infra Part Il.B.2.
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 112 (2009) (citation omitted)
("The bulk of employment discrimination cases turn on intent, and not on disparate impact.").
20. See infra Part ELI.A.L.
21. See infra Part H.A.
22. See infra Part E.B.
23. See infra Part EI.B.
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individual decision maker's actions. 24 As this Article suggests, this vast body of
research and experience has shifted the baseline knowledge about both the risks
of bias infecting employment decisions and the methods to control it from doing
so.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies three existing and
influential theories for framing disparate treatment under Title VII upon which
this Article's theory of reckless discrimination builds: employer liability for
negligent discrimination; employer liability for decisions affected by implicit
bias, proven with social framework evidence; and an organizational context
model of direct employer entity liability. In Part II, the Article addresses how the
Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes impacted plaintiffs' ability
to redress systemic disparate treatment and implicit bias under Title VII. This
Part seeks to make a course correction in Title VII jurisprudence after Wal-Mart
by separating the deep body of reliable social science research on implicit bias
and stereotyping from the now seemingly disfavored "social framework" theory
of proving systemic discrimination. Part III then builds upon Parts I and II by
articulating a new theoretical framework for reckless discrimination that aims to
help modernize Title VII's reach. This Part suggests that Title VII jurisprudence
must adapt to reflect what we know about the more subtle and structural ways
discrimination occurs today, and it offers the recklessness frame as one way to
do so.
Importantly, a model of reckless discrimination does not seek to end
discretionary decision making at work, which is a universally adopted practice
without which most employers would be unable to operate. Instead, it seeks to
improve upon such systems by creating a legal incentive for employers both to
monitor how that discretion is being exercised and to correct for any detected
bias before it results in liability for employment discrimination.
Also, as this Article will address, a theory of reckless discrimination is not
a magic bullet. It, like the theories upon which it builds, offers strengths and
weaknesses. A recklessness model may be subject to criticism from employment
discrimination skeptics and Title VII purists alike. Skeptics may claim that
recklessness does not prove "intent" to discriminate as required under Title VII;
conversely, purists may argue that a recklessness frame misappropriates tort
concepts and heightens what a Title VII plaintiff need prove, beyond what is
required by statute.25 While acknowledging that recklessness is not a panacea,
this Article looks to the concept of recklessness to contribute a pragmatic, new
approach to the ongoing efforts to remedy systemic employment discrimination
in the wake of Wal-Mart v. Dukes. As societal understanding of the operation of
discriminatory bias evolves, so too should our expectations of employer behavior
and the legal doctrine by which it is regulated.
24. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part Ul.C.2.
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I.
EXISTING THEORIES FOR MODERNIZING TITLE VII DISPARATE TREATMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in hiring,
firing, pay, and other "terms, conditions, or privileges" of work, as well as the
adoption of policies or practices that "deprive any individual of employment
opportunities" "because of" a protected classification ("race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin").26 As interpreted, the statute recognizes two main causes of
action for discrimination: disparate treatment-in which employees allege that
their protected class played a role in adverse employment actions taken against
them27-and disparate impact-in which employees allege that an employer's
facially neutral policy or practice disproportionately disadvantaged members of
a protected class.28 In addition, the Court has recognized subcategories of
disparate treatment, including harassment, stereotyping, and, for the protected
classes of religion and pregnancy, failure to accommodate as required by law.29
Using these theories, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, cases brought
under Title VII made significant headway in redressing obvious discrimination
and advancing the employment opportunities of women and racial minorities. 30
By the late 1980s, however, awareness of antidiscrimination laws had become
widespread and workplaces opened up to more diverse workforces.3 1 The
manifestations of discriminatory bias moved from exclusion in hiring to hostile
treatment in the workplace and inequality in pay and advancement
opportunities.32  Cases alleging harassment, disparate impact, and sex
stereotyping continued to make headway in redressing less overt discrimination,
but by the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, advances in workplace equality
stalled.33 Disparities in employment equality for women and racial minorities
persisted-and continue to do so today-particularly in the lack of diversity at
the middle and top of organizations. 34
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
27. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
28. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 299; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 792; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (religious accommodation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (pregnancy
accommodation); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (stereotyping); Meritor Say. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual harassment).
30. See 35 Years of Ensuring the Promise of Opportunity, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/history/index.html [https://perma.cc/T6EE-GYFC]
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
31. See id.
32. See id
33. See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 921-22 (2016).
34. Recent data bears this out See id. at 922-23 (citing data on race and gender inequity at
work). Several studies suggest that, after controlling for variables like education and experience, sex
discrimination accounts for unexplained disparities in pay and promotion rates. See, e.g., Francine D.
Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations (Nat'l Bureau of
10612017]
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In the mid-1990s, coinciding with this stall, and based on a growing body
of social science research, legal scholars and employee advocates identified that
the operation of bias-pre-judgment that shapes decision making35 --was
entrenched in ways existing law appeared unable to reach. They began to think
about how liability under Title VII could reach subtler and "structural" forms of
discrimination-meaning, discrimination built into and fostered by workplace
decision-making structures, cultures, and interactions.
A growing recognition of the science on implicit bias and stereotyping was
key to these efforts. Implicit bias occurs when prior opinions and experiences
unfairly influence one's thought processes without conscious awareness (for
example, a female candidate with equal qualifications is passed over for
promotion because the male candidate just seems more like a leader).37
Stereotypes are mental shortcuts that individuals make to sort information; they
may be made without conscious awareness, making them a type of implicit bias,
or they may be made more consciously, with a belief that they are benign (for
example, a new mother is passed over for a promotion because her employer
assumes she won't want to travel).38
Where implicit bias or stereotyping related to a person's protected class
status (for example, sex) unfairly influences an employment decision against
them (for example, denial of a promotion), Title VII should step in. Yet those
trying to establish liability for such harm under Title VII, particularly on a group
rather than an individual basis, have faced obstacles. This Part describes three of
the most influential theories for holding employers liable for the impact of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21913, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21913.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RL4B-HFJ6]; Francine D. Blau & Jed DeVaro, New Evidence on Gender Differences
in Promotion Rates: An Empirical Analysis of a Sample of New Hires, 46 INDUs. REL. 511, 511-50
(2007). Women compose half of the American workforce, but only about 5 to 15 percent of top earners,
Fortune 500 CEOs, equity partners at law firms, and corporate senior management See JUDITH
WARNER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP GAP: WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP BY THE
NUMBERS 1-2 (2014). Racial minorities compose one-third of the U.S. workforce, but only 4 to 6
percent of Fortune 500 CEOs and equity partners at law firms. See CROSBY BURNS, KIMBERLY BARTON
& SOPHIA KERBY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE STATE OF DIVERSITY IN TODAY'S WORKFORCE: As
OuR NATION BECOMES MORE DIVERSE So Too DOES OUR WORKFORCE 2, 5 (2012); Despite Small
Gains in the Representation of Women and Minorities Among Equity Partners, Broad Disparities
Remain, NAT'L ASS'N L. PLACEMENT (June 2015), http://www.nalp.org/0615research
[https://perma.ccIR5Y6-CMJ9].
35. See JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 41 (2008) ("A 'bias' is a departure from
the normative model in a particular direction."); Bias, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014)
(defining "bias" as "[a] mental inclination or tendency; prejudice; predilection").
36. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458,460-61 (2001).
37. Bornstein, supra note 33, at 938-39 (citing Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 4-6 (1995)).
A complete discussion of implicit or cognitive bias is beyond the scope of this Article.
38. Bornstein, supra note 33, at 938-39 & n.104 (citing Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 37, at
4-6 (identifying and discussing three key categories of implicit cognition: "attitudes, self-esteem, and
stereotypes"); Jerry Kang, et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1132-35
(2012) (describing the difference between explicit, concealed, and implicit attitudes and stereotypes)).
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implicit bias in the workplace-theories this Article refers to as (1) the
negligence model, (2) the vicarious social framework model, and (3) the
organizational context model.39
Theorizing employer liability to reach the expression of deeper, more
ingrained bias in the workplace poses two separate, but related doctrinal
challenges. First, such theorizing requires holding an employer entity liable for
the operation of implicit biases about which individual employment decision
makers may be unaware. The most commonly alleged theory of
discrimination 40-and the theory relevant to a recklessness model of
discrimination-is disparate treatment. Using a disparate treatment approach, an
employee, or group of employees, must prove that the employer engaged in
"intentional" discrimination when taking an adverse employment action against
them; they can do so by providing circumstantial evidence of discrimination that
the employer cannot rebut with an adequate nondiscriminatory justification.4 1
The specific framework of proof depends on whether the claim is brought by an
individual or by a class of employees alleging the employer engaged in a "pattern
or practice" of discrimination-also known as "systemic" disparate treatment.42
And, regardless of whether an individual or class case, courts interpreting Title
VII have required that disparate treatment discrimination be "intentional."4 3
39. In a previous work, I identified how another existing legal doctrine recognized under Title
VI-the sub-type of disparate treatment known as stereotyping-can be more broadly applied in Title
VII jurisprudence to respond to current court criticisms of systemic disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories of liability. See Bornstein, supra note 33, at 919. A discussion of greater application of
stereotype theory, as recognized in the case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989),
is beyond the scope of this Article's separate focus on conceptualizing a recklessness model for disparate
treatment based on implicit bias. For further discussion of stereotyping and the relationship between
implicit bias and stereotyping, see Bornstein, supra note 33, at 938-39.
40. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 19, at 112 (most common). Under disparate impact
theory, plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory intent. Instead, they must prove that the employer
adopted a policy or practice that appeared neutral on its face but resulted in a disproportionately negative
impact on members of a protected class, and that the employer's use of that policy is not justified by
some "business necessity" that a less discriminatory policy could not also meet See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). In general, the disparate impact framework appeals less to
plaintiffs because it provides no right to a jury trial, limited remedies (compensatory and punitive
damages are only available for intentional discrimination under Title VII), and because the employer
has a broad affirmative defense where any policy that results in a disparate impact serves a legitimate
"business necessity." See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 767-82 (2006) (describing disparate impact's limitations); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate
Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 968, 993 (2006).
Moreover, in the recent case of Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 576-93 (2009), the Supreme Court
limited the reach of the disparate impact theory by holding that an employer may not take efforts to
remedy a workplace practice that has discriminatory effects on some without risking liability for
intentional discrimination against others whom the practice favors. A discussion of disparate impact
theory as a means of redressing discrimination without having to prove intent is beyond this Article's
focus on using recklessness as a concept to modernize disparate treatment jurisprudence.
41. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 299; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 792.
42. Compare McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-07, with Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 306-13.
43. See infra Part.EII.A.
10632017]
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Yet notably, the word "intent" does not appear in the statutory text that
defines unlawful employment practices under Title VII.44 As described more
fully in Part III, "intentional" disparate treatment is a flexible concept ofjudicial
design and interpretation.45 So long as employees can show that protected class
membership entered the chain of volitional acts that resulted in adverse
employment actions, they may prevail.4 6 Implicit bias arises most often when an
employer entity relies on supervisors to make subjective decisions, whether those
decisions are made in the context of deciding whom to hire or promote, setting
assignments or pay, or evaluating performance.4 7 Subjective employment
decision-making systems can be-and, on occasion, have been-challenged
under the alternate approach of disparate impact, as a facially neutral policy that
has a disproportionate result by protected class.48 But, as a matter of both practice
and doctrinal clarity, plaintiffs have preferred to litigate such cases as disparate
treatment,49 which more accurately reflects the role implicit bias plays in specific
workplace actions taken toward individuals or groups.50 Thus, theorizing
employer liability for the operation of implicit bias in a workplace requires
grappling with discriminatory "intent."
The second doctrinal challenge for redressing implicit bias and stereotyping
at work is whether and how to hold an employer entity liable for widespread but
seemingly individual employment decisions infected by implicit bias. As
discussed further in Part II, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes demonstrates the challenge of remedying pronounced, but diffuse, bias
and stereotyping in a large organization that had a nondiscrimination policy on
paper, yet turned a blind eye to data indicating a serious problem.' Social
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2012). The only reference to intent in the text of Title VII
was added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made compensatory and punitive damages available
"against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice
that is unlawful because of its disparate impact)." Id. § 1981a(a)(1).
45. See infra Part. II.A..
46. See id.
47. See William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias, 29 CONTEMP. SOC.
120, 123-27 (2000) (citation omitted) ("[P]ersonnel systems whose criteria for making decisions are
arbitrary and subjective are highly vulnerable to bias due to the influence of stereotypes-as, for
example, when individual managers have a great deal of discretion with little in the way of written
guidelines or effective oversight"); Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment
Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 323-27 (2000).
48. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 989-1000 (1988).
49. See supra note 40.
50. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1219-20, 1229-37
(1995). "The disparate impact paradigm ... is an inappropriate analytical tool for addressing the
intergroup biases inherent in subjective decision-making.... From a phenomenological standpoint,
subjective practices discrimination is a disparate treatment problem, notadisparate impact problem, and
it requires a disparate treatment solution." Id. at 1231; see also Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory
in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 490-95 (2005) (situating
the problem of unconscious bias within disparate treatment and disparate impact doctrines).
51. See infra Part.II.A.
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science research on the operation of implicit bias in subjective decision making
may be relevant to both a discriminatory individual employment decision and
the widespread occurrence of disparate treatment throughout an organization.
The question becomes how to frame liability under Title VII in a way that does
not allow a court to view these as mutually exclusive.52
Each of the three foundational theories for redressing implicit bias in the
workplace discussed in this Part resolves these two challenges in its own way-
ideas upon which a recklessness model then builds.
A. Negligence Model
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of legal scholars began to
incorporate social science research on the operation of bias into work on
antidiscrimination jurisprudence.53 In 1993, David Oppenheimer proposed one
such foundational theory under Title VII in his important work, Negligent
Discrimination.54 In his article, Oppenheimer first carefully and rigorously
detailed how, despite case law interpreting Title VII to require that plaintiffs
prove intentional discrimination, most of Title VII doctrine in fact reflects a
model of negligence.55 As he documented, under the legal theory of sexual
harassment, an employer is held strictly liable for a supervisor's harassment of a
subordinate, subject to an employer's affirmative defense.56 Likewise, both
disparate impact theory and Title VII's requirement that religious practices be
accommodated impose duties on an employer to prevent discrimination with no
proof of discriminatory intent.57 Because, as Oppenheimer explained, "the
existing law of employment discrimination, while eschewing the term
negligence, frequently incorporates the doctrine," he proposed a negligence
theory for disparate treatment under Title VII.58
52. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011) ('The only corporate policy
that the plaintiffs' evidence convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart's 'policy' of allowing discretion by
local supervisors over employment matters. On its face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform
employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against
having uniform employment practices.").
53. This Article focuses on statutory law under Title VII. A rich and vast body of work also
addresses issues of intent and cognitive bias in the constitutional law of Equal Protection, which is
beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now ISee": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement
ofDiscriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Daniel R. Ortiz,
The Myth ofIntent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
54. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899
(1992).
55. See id. at 899-900, 915-19, 934-36, 967-72.
56. See id. at 960.
57. See id. at 937-39, 968.
58. See id. at 899.
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Under a negligence theory, Oppenheimer argued, an employer could be
held liable when it "fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination
that it knows or should know is occurring, or that it expects or should expect to
occur." 59 This approach rests on recognition that Title VII created a statutory
duty of care owed by employers to employees to prevent the harm of
discrimination because of protected class status.6 0 To prove an employer's
liability for disparate treatment under a negligence theory, then, a plaintiff would
be required to show "a mere failure [by the employer] to have thought critically
before acting" rather than showing discriminatory intent. 61 A negligence
framework also "places the focus on the discrimination, not the motivation,"
which offers the possibility of reaching structural discrimination directly.62
Indeed, as Oppenheimer suggested, adopting a negligence approach would allow
liability in cases involving "unconscious, but wrongful, motivation," without
having to "squeeze [them] uncomfortably into an intentional tort analysis." 6 3
Oppenheimer's work has influenced scholars' continued attempts to redress
entrenched discrimination at work. Fifteen years later, Noah Zatz looked to the
availability of employer liability under Title VII for harassment of employees by
third parties to question the meaning of "intent to discriminate" under Title VII.64
The availability of negligence approaches within some aspects of Title VII led
Zatz to question the doctrinal divide between disparate treatment and other legal
theories of proof.65 More recent still, Richard Thompson Ford revisited and built
upon a negligence framework, applying a legal realist lens, to propose a duty of
care approach to structural discrimination at work.66 Ford argued that the
doctrine of Title VII requires concrete answers to questions that defy precise
proof-that the law's requirement of "intent" and "causation" seek facts that are
difficult to measure and verify objectively. 67 Instead, Ford suggested, Title VII
should more appropriately regulate a duty of care imposed on employers "to
avoid decisions that undermine social equality," not by redefining the legal
definition of "intent" to meet social science advances, but instead by refining an
employer's duty not to undermine equality.
59. See id. at 900.
60. See id. at 936, 948.
61. See id. at 971.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 972.
64. See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the
Disaggregation ofDiscriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1357, 1364 (2009).
65. See id. at 1358.
66. See Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law,
66 STAN. L.REv. 1381 (2014).
67. See id. at 1381, 1390-92.
68. See id at 1381, 1384, 1415-21. "[T]he law should replace the conceptually elusive goal of
eliminating discrimination with the more concrete goal ofrequiring employers ... to meet a duty of care
to avoid unnecessarily perpetuating social segregation or hierarchy." Id. at 1384.
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As influential as it has been, Oppenheimer's negligence approach was also,
perhaps, ahead of its time in its effort to adapt Title VII doctrine to insights from
social science research on implicit bias that were not well-known beyond
academic circles in 1993. As a result, while its descriptive power holds true for
much of Title VII, courts have largely failed to adopt a negligence approach in
the context of disparate treatment, due to its apparent conflict with case law
interpreting such claims to require proof of "intentional" discrimination. 6 9
Oppenheimer's work, however, raised the important question of what duty
employers owe to employees. His negligence approach pushed back on the intent
"requirement" entirely, instead offering a way to hold an employer entity
responsible for its failure to meet its statutory duty to prevent discrimination in
the workplace. 7 0
B. Vicarious Social Framework Model
A second highly influential theory, which this Article refers to as the
"vicarious social framework model," focuses on the social science of implicit
bias and liability for discrimination based on the employer's role in controlling
its operation. In 1995, Linda Krieger paved the way for this theory in her ground-
breaking article The Content of Our Categories.7 1 Since then, numerous scholars
in both law and social science have contributed to its development and
popularization. 72
69. See Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Title
VII ... provides no remedy for negligent discrimination."); Aaron v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No.
3:08 CV 1471, 2009 WL 803586, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25,2009) (stating that where the defendant
"was merely 'negligent' in its hiring practices, [that] does not rise to the standard of intentional
discrimination required by Title VII"); Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common
Law, and Proximate Cause, U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2013) (citing Aaron, 2009 WL 803586, at
*2) ("To date, the courts have not embraced negligent discrimination as a basis for liability.");
Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REv. 1051, 1074-75 (2014) ("To date, the courts
have not embraced arguments that plaintiffs may establish a discrimination claim via a negligence
analysis."). But cf Pippen v. Iowa, 854 N.W.2d 1, 18-19 (Iowa 2014) ("There is reason to believe
that at least some members of the United States Supreme Court might be interested in negligence
theory in the context of subjective decision-making. At oral argument in the Wal-Mart matter,
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts asked questions about whether the plaintiff was
advancing a 'notice theory,' namely, that an employer aware of the discriminatory impact of its
subjective practices may be liable under the Federal Civil Rights Act.").
70. See Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at 971.
71. See Krieger, supra note 50.
72. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1
HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 477 (2007); Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893
(2009); Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 747 (2001); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a
Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995);
Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account ofDisparate
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking
and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Tanya Kateri Hemindez, One Path for
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Under the vicarious social framework approach, evidence on the operation
of stereotypes and implicit biases-that is, biases and associations that affect our
perceptions and judgments without our conscious awareness-is offered to
create an inference of discrimination when workplace decisions have
discriminatory results, yet the decision makers do not believe they harbor bias.73
Informed by deep social science research, Krieger proposed that evidence on the
"biasing effects of social stereotypes, the tendency towards schematic
information processing, the salience of race, gender, and other social categories,
and the apparent automaticity of ingroup favoritism," could create an inference
that an adverse employment action taken against a member of a protected class
may have been "contaminated by cognitive sources of intergroup bias." 74 This
contamination, she argued, was enough to meet Title VII's requirement that, to
prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that their protected classification
was "a motivating factor" in the adverse employment decision, despite a lack of
discriminatory purpose on the part of the decision maker." While Krieger agreed
that "a negligence approach ... would further Title VII's purpose," she focused
on an employer's "duty to identify and control for errors in social perception and
judgment which inevitably occur, even among the well-intended." 76 This
approach again pushed back on the formulation of disparate treatment as
requiring "intent." Disparate treatment occurred when bias infected an individual
employment decision. Then, on a systemic level, the employer entity was
vicariously responsible: because the employer controlled the decision-making
structures in the workplace, it had a duty to prevent the operation of bias
throughout the organization."7
In the twenty years since Krieger's article was published, a vast body of
social science research has identified how employers can interrupt and correct
for the cognitive or implicit biases Krieger identified. 7 8 As a result, legal scholars
"Post-Racial" Employment Discrimination Cases-The Implicit Association Test Research as Social
Framework Evidence, 32 J.L. & INEQ. 307 (2014); Jerry Kang, et al., supra note 38; Jolls & Sunstein,
supra note 7; Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1003 n.21 (2006)
(cataloguing the literature on implicit bias); Ann C. McGinley, lViva La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing
Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000); Michelle A. Travis,
Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 55 VAND. L. REv. 481 (2002);
Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-
Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001). But see, e.g., Gregory Mitchell &
Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils ofMindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006);
Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999); Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating
Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979 (2008).
73. See Krieger, supra note 50, at 1186-90, 1241-44; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 72, at 1052-
62.
74. See Krieger, supra note 50, at 1186-90, 1241-44.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1245-47.
77. See id.
78. See infra Part.I.B.
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and social scientists have combined research on bias with what is known as
"social framework" evidence to allege systemic disparate treatment. 79 This
approach, made popular since the early 2000s by social scientists including
William Bielby and Barbara Reskin, theorizes employer entity liability for the
operation of implicit bias throughout an organization.so To use a social
framework approach, experts offer scientific testimony about how stereotypes
and biases operate to impact individual employment decisions and how different
types of organizational structures are more likely to either activate or control
decision makers' implicit biases.81 When combined with evidence that an
employer adopted organizational structures more likely to activate implicit
biases (for example, broad, unchecked subjective decision making), and data on
disparities in the employer's workforce by protected class (for example, that a
disproportionate number of women are denied promotions), a factfinder can infer
discriminatory intent on the part of the employer. 82 The employer can then be
held liable, the theory goes, for widespread disparate treatment when it fails to
prevent or correct workplace structures infected with implicit bias. 83
A number of federal courts have upheld plaintiffs' cases against challenges
by employers where the plaintiff alleged discrimination using implicit bias
evidence or under a vicarious social framework theory.84 Yet despite initial
success, plaintiffs seeking to apply this approach now face an uphill battle. After
growing in popularity and acceptance, both in practice and in the courts, the
social framework piece of vicarious implicit bias theory has suffered a steady
backlash from a small group of academics that oppose it, including the coiners
79. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 72, at 1005-06, 1052-62.
80. See, e.g., Declaration of Barbara F. Reskin, Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C-04-3341 MHP); Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.RD. 137 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (No. C-012252 MJJ); Bielby, supra note 47, at 120-29; Reskin, supra note 47, at 319-328; see
also Herndndez, supra note 72, at 307-18 (describing the social framework method of proving systemic
disparate treatment).
81. See Krieger& Fiske, supra note 72, at 1052-62; Melissa Hart& Paul. M. Secunda, A Matter
of Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 37, 41-50 (2010).
82. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 72, at 1052-62.
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Thomas v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38,61 (1st Cir. 1999)) ("As this circuit has repeatedly held, stereotyping, cognitive
bias, and certain other 'more subtle cognitive phenomena which can skew perception and judgments'
also fall within the ambit of Title VII's prohibition."); Thomas, 183 F.3d at 59 ("The Supreme Court has
long recognized that unlawful discrimination can stem from stereotypes and other types of cognitive
biases, as well as from conscious animus."); Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1265, 1272 (10th Cir.
1988); Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Inland Marine Indust., 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984);
Kimble v. Wis. Dept. of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 775-78 (E.D. Wis. 2010); Dow v.
Donovan, 150 F. Supp. 2d, 249, 263-64 (D. Mass. 2001). But see, e.g., Tucker v. Ga. Dep't of Pub.
Safety, Civil Action No. CV208-33, 2009 WL 2135807, *6 (S.D. Ga. 2009) ("At least in this Circuit, a
'subtle bias' claim based on subconscious cognitive stereotypes is not tenable as a disparate treatment
claim.").
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of the term "social frameworks." 85 An academic backlash in and of itself may
pose no threat to a legal theory, but some federal courts have taken notice,
including the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.86 As discussed in Part II,
while Wal-Mart addressed such evidence in the limited context of a class
certification petition, the Court's decision raised questions about the validity of
the social framework approach more generally, the full impact of which remains
to be seen.
C. Organizational Context Model
In a series of works starting in 2003, Tristin Green proposed a third
important theory for systemic disparate treatment that aimed to shift liability to
the employer entity more directly.87 Articulating what she called the "context
model" for employment discrimination litigation," Green proposed that Title
VII could "impose [a legal] obligation on employers not to facilitate
discriminatory decision making in the workplace." 89 Green's approach
recognizes the operation of implicit bias and stereotypes, but focuses on the
employer at the entity level directly. She frames the violation under Title VII as
the employer entity's organizational choices and creation of a work context that
fosters biased employment decision making. 90 In so doing, Green's approach
moves beyond concerns about the lack of fit between "unconscious" bias and
"intentional" discrimination because the employer entity has acted intentionally
when choosing its decision-making structures. As Green explains, it is a mistake
to conflate individual manager decisions with "the employer wrong," which, she
argues, "lies less in the individual decisionmaker's action than in the employer's
structuring of a work environment that facilitates bias in the individual
decisionmaker's action."91 As such, Title VII can hold employer entities
"responsible for their causal role" in systemic disparate treatment directly, 92 not
85. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 375 n.8 (2011); Mitchell & Tetlock,
supra note 72, at 1052-56; John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence
of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of "Social Frameworks," 94 VA. L. REv. 1715, 1747
(2008).
86. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 375 n.8.
87. See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 72; Tristin K. Green,
Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 659
(2004); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623 (2005); Tristin
Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 849 (2007); see also Tristin IC Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 397 (2011).
88. See Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate, supra note 87, at 852-
53 ("structural approach"); Green, The Future ofSystemic Disparate Treatment Law, supra note 87, at
441-42 ("context model").
89. See Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate, supra note 87, at 852-
54.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 897-98.
92. Id
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merely vicariously liable for the acts of individual supervisors or decision
makers.
In focusing on the entity level, Green's approach also allows Title VII to
reach the contextual and cultural ways in which bias is fostered in the workplace.
Rather than being a "passive bystander," Green argues, an employer
intentionally creates a "distinct organizational 'ethos' [that] serve[s] as the basis
for employer responsibility for the wrong of structural discrimination." 93
Individual supervisors make decisions within a work culture that the employer
entity controls. As Green explains, "one can accept that implicit biases have been
'programmed into our brains by overarching societal influences' and at the same
time expect employers to refrain from creating work environments that facilitate
the operation of those biases in workplace decisionmaking." 94 The entity itself
"necessarily shape[s]" the context within which individual decision makers act,
so, if "disparate treatment is widespread within an organization ... the entity is
directly liable for producing that disparate treatment." 95
Green's organizational context model moves beyond individuals to focus
on entity-wide discrimination, which may allow plaintiffs to more easily
overcome the hurdle of proving "intent." As Green argues, and as described more
fully in Part II, below, the existing framework of proof for "pattern-or-practice"
cases of systemic disparate treatment (established in the 1977 Supreme Court
cases of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States and Hazelwood
School District v. United States) requires nothing more than circumstantial
evidence of a significant workplace disparity by protected class that, if left
unexplained by the employer, creates an inference of intentional
discrimination. 96 Under existing doctrine, employees can demonstrate such
disparities with statistical, social science, and anecdotal evidence. 97 Yet, in
practice, as bias has become more subtle and covert over time, it has become less
likely that a court will make that inference. As Green herself has documented,
over the past decade, the promise of Title VII to reach organizational
responsibility has been hampered by the courts' shift to viewing systemic
disparate treatment cases as a mere "aggregation" of individual claims of biased
93. Id at 889-90, 890 n.148.
94. Id. at 899-900.
95. Green, The Future ofSystemic Disparate Treatment Law, supra note 87, at 441.
96. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, supra
note 87, at 446-47 ('[S]ystemic disparate treatment law does not require plaintiffs to present social
science testimony to the effect that particular organizational or institutional features either are producing
or did produce the observed disparity. Plaintiffs need only prove widespread disparate treatment within
the organization, and social science testimony can be used to help make that showing."); infra Part
M.A.1.
97. See Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, supra note 87, at 446-47;
TRISTIN K. GREEN, DIscRIMINATIoN LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND
THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW 66-75 (2017).
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treatment by biased supervisors. 98 The organization itself, this view goes, is
innocent of wrongdoing, and seeking to hold the entity responsible for systemic
disparate treatment is like punishing the entity for being a mere "conduit" of
societal biases.99 Thus, while Green's model offers both an argument to hold the
employer entity directly liable for its own actions and a mechanism to do so
supported by Title VII, it, too, has suffered from a narrow judicial interpretation.
Despite the explanatory power of and statutory support for all three
foundational theories for redressing implicit bias at work, as a normative matter,
federal courts appear loathe to recognize that an employer entity has an
affirmative duty to prevent, a responsibility to correct, or even an obligation not
to perpetuate such bias. Yet the social science on implicit bias and its impact on
subjective decision making-a system on which most employers rely
extensively-remain compelling, and the resulting inequity remains a problem
that Title VII must reach. To do so requires both reviving the key role of social
science evidence in employment discrimination law and theorizing a frame for
employer-entity responsibility to which federal courts may be more receptive, an
effort to which the following Parts now turn.
II.
DISPARATE TREATMENT IN THE WAKE OF WAL-MART V. DUKES
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the 2011 case Wal-Mart v. Dukes
has hampered the initial success of existing theories articulating liability under
Title VII for the operation of implicit bias at work.100 A close analysis of the
Wal-Mart decision reveals, however, that courts need not and should not throw
the baby-vast and reliable social science data on stereotypes and implicit bias-
out with the bathwater-the now seemingly disfavored "social framework"
theory of proving systemic disparate treatment. This Part discusses the Wal-Mart
holding and subsequent scholarship that attempts to make sense of its impact. It
then provides a brief survey of cases decided in the five years after Wal-Mart to
illustrate how courts continue to rely on implicit bias and stereotyping evidence.
Thus, despite the setback to the social framework model of litigation, the social
science research on bias remains as robust as ever, able to serve as the foundation
for a recklessness framework.
A. What Wal-Mart v. Dukes Did and Did Not Hold
In its 2011 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court rejected class
certification of a group of plaintiffs alleging, among other claims, systemic
98. See GREEN, supra note 97, at 74-84; see also Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate
Treatment Law, supra note 87, at 431 n.153, 441 n.192 (describing Justice Ginsburg's difficulty in
framing systemic disparate treatment at the entity level).
99. See GREEN, supra note 97, at 74-84.
100. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 356-58, 366-67 (2011).
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disparate treatment. 0 1 The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of current and
former female Wal-Mart employees who had experienced sex discrimination in
pay and promotion. Plaintiffs alleged that the employer was aware of widespread
and unchecked subjective decision making that resulted in discrimination against
female employees. 102 The Wal-Mart decision reached the Supreme Court on a
motion for class certification; thus, the only decision before the Court was
whether the plaintiffs met the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 to certify a class action. o3 When answering this question and considering
Rule 23's requirement of "commonality" (whether there are questions of fact or
law common to the potential class members), the Court dealt a blow to the
implicit bias social framework theory of proof more generally. 10 4 In a divided
majority opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court rejected plaintiffs'
expert William Bielby's social framework evidence. The Court noted that
because Bielby could not specify what percentage of decisions at the company
were infected by implicit bias, the expert testimony "[did] nothing to advance
[the plaintiffs'] case" and the Court could "safely disregard" it. 10 Ultimately, the
Court viewed the claims as lacking the necessary commonality to support class
certification because they sought to aggregate the harms of "literally millions of
employment decisions at once ... [w]ithout some glue holding the alleged
reasons for all those decisions together."l 06
In Wal-Mart's aftermath, scholars were near-unanimous in their
interpretation of the case as a significant obstacle to future claims of systemic
disparate treatment.10 7 Indeed, the decision effectively ended one common route
for pursuing employment discrimination class actions: seeking back pay while
certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 0 8 Moreover, over a dissent by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg on the issue of commonality, the Court majority disparaged an
evidentiary route that had been gaining popularity among plaintiffs' counsel:
using implicit bias and social framework evidence to prove intentional
employment discrimination.' 09
101. See id. at 352-57.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id at 354.
106. See id at 352.
107. See Joseph Seiner, Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1350-51 (2014)
(cataloguing and summarizing the academic response). But see Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren
Vault: The Implications ofDukes v. Wal-Martfor Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices,
29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 454-65 (2012) (questioning empirically the impact of the Wal-Mart
decision because similar claims (class actions to challenge discretionary decision making) are rare
among all employment discrimination cases).
108. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360-62. Even the dissenting justices agreed with this piece of the
holding. See id. at 368-70 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 352-62.
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While Wal-Mart cast doubt on the role of social framework evidence, three
important caveats limit its potential impact on future employment discrimination
cases. First, as mentioned above, these issues were only examined in the case of
a class certification petition. Thus, while the Court held it could "disregard"
Bielby's evidence, it did so only in the context of determining whether the class
had common issues of law or fact, and not in any substantive holding on the
underlying merits of the case.1 10 Second, and importantly, the Court did not reject
the validity of the scientific research upon which Bielby's expert testimony was
based-the science of how implicit bias and stereotyping operate and how
different types of workplace structures allow bias to infect employment
decisions."' Instead, the Court rejected the evidence because it failed to prove
that individual decision makers applied discretion in a consistently
discriminatory manner.112 As scholars have noted, the majority ignored that
plaintiffs offered this evidence as general causal proof, to support an inference
of discrimination in the absence of a justification for observed disparities.1 13
Third, the plaintiffs alleged a pattern or practice of discrimination across a
massive nationwide company affecting 1.5 million class members, which was
the largest class action ever attempted. 14 Thus plaintiffs can, and do, continue
to use implicit bias evidence to help create an inference of discrimination in cases
that can be distinguished from the behemoth Wal-Mart case. 15
Nevertheless, the decision leaves an open question about how plaintiffs
may prove systemic disparate treatment going forward. In a symposium on the
future of pattern-or-practice cases in the wake of Wal-Mart, Michael Selmi,
Noah Zatz, and Tristin Green, in separate pieces, each identified the source of
the problem. After Wal-Mart, plaintiffs would have to identify a way to hold an
employer entity liable for class-wide intentional discrimination based on
individual supervisors' decisions infected with implicit bias.11 6 Selmi suggested
that future cases would need a more "coherent narrative" of discrimination, and
Zatz described the need for greater "connective tissue"-what Justice Scalia
referred to as "the glue," for plaintiffs to prevail.1 17 Echoing her earlier work,
Green expressed concern that the Court had moved away from foundational Title
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 354-55 (stating that it was unnecessary to consider whether the evidence met the
Daubert standard because it did "nothing to advance" plaintiffs' case).
113. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs: The Future of Employment
Discrimination Class Actions, 32 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 455, 457,472-73 (2011).
114. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 342-46.
115. See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492,520-21 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Chen-
Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d. 113, 113-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
116. See Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 481 (2011); Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group
on the Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387, 388, 391
(2011); Green, The Future ofSystemic Disparate Treatment Law, supra note 87, at 397.
117. See Selmi, supra note 116, at 481; Zatz, supra note 116, at 388, 391.
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VII pattern-or-practice precedent, which allow courts to hold employer entities
responsible for creating the context in which systemic disparate treatment occurs,
rather than merely vicariously as an "aggregation" of individual decisions."1 8
While the sheer size of the Wal-Mart class has allowed plaintiffs in a handful of
subsequent cases to distinguish themselves from the decision,1 19 the problem
remains: how to theorize entity liability under Title VII to reach the structural
discrimination that results when implicit bias infects workplace decision making.
B. Case Law on Implicit Bias and Stereotyping After Wal-Mart v. Dukes
In the wake of the Wal-Mart decision, it is possible that the Court's ruling
against the way in which plaintiffs used the scientific evidence on bias might
unfairly cast a larger pall over the reliability and importance of such evidence in
general. A basic survey of Title VII cases decided by federal courts in the wake
of Wal-Mart reveals that the bark-the decision's potential impact on the future
of implicit bias evidence-may have been bigger than its bite. Of the roughly
twenty-seven hundred federal court cases citing the Wal-Mart decision in the
five years after it was announced, only twenty-one make reference to Dr. Bielby,
social frameworks, or implicit bias.12 0 Of those cases, only fifteen engage in
discussion of evidence or class certification in the context of employment
claims-eight cases distinguish the Wal-Mart case, 12 1 and only seven cases
(including one subsequent proceeding in Wal-Mart) rely on Wal-Mart to either
limit class certification in part or exclude some piece of plaintiffs' evidence.1 22
And, while thirty-two additional cases citing Wal-Mart reference the related
118. See Green, The Future ofSystemic Disparate Treatment Law, supra note 87, at 397; GREEN,
supra note 97, at 74-84.
119. See, e.g., Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 520-21; Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d. at 118-19.
120. The Wal-Mart decision was announced on June 20, 2011. Results from a Westlaw search
conducted August 20, 2016 (within all Key Cite results for Wal-Mart v. Dukes, all federal cases, search
for: ("social framework!" or "Bielby" or "implicit bias" or "cognitive bias")).
121. See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 901-02 (4th Cir. 2015); Scott v. Family Dollar
Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 112-17 (4th Cir. 2013); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 487-92 (7th Cir. 2012); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 114 F. Supp.
3d 110, 114-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 507-09; Hargrove v. Ryla Teleservices, Inc.,
Action No. 2:11cv344, 2012 WL 489216, at *4-*6 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2012); Bouaphakeo v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-JAJ, 2011 WL 3793962, at *1-*4 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 2011); Smith v.
Ceva Logistics U.S., Inc., No. CV 09-4957 CAS (RCx), 2011 WL 3204682, at *6-*9 (C.D. Cal. July
25, 2011).
122. See Jones v. Nat'l Council of YMCA, 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 903-10 (N.D. I11. 2014)
(excluding in part plaintiffs' expert evidence); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1115,
1127-28 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (subsequent proceeding in Wal-Mart, similarly denying certification of a
smaller class of plaintiffs); Pana v. Bashas', Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360, 402-03 (D. Ariz. 2013) (granting in
part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for class certification); Valerino v. Holder, 283 F.R.D. 302,
309-19 (E.D. Va. 2012) (granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for class certification);
Peterson v. Seagate U.S. LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1006-09 (D. Minn. 2011) (excluding in part
plaintiffs' expert evidence); Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 80-86 (3d Cir. 2017)
(excluding in part plaintiffs' expert evidence); Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. LA CV10-08486 JAK
(FFMx), 2012 WL 1366052, at *6-* 15 (C.D. Cal., Apr. 18, 2012) (same).
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concept of stereotypes or stereotyping, only four resulted in limitations on
plaintiffs' employment claims. 123 Moreover, in the five years after the Wal-Mart
decision, nearly eight hundred other federal court cases involving Title VII
referenced implicit bias or stereotyping without citing to the Wal-Mart case at
all-meaning that case law has continued to engage with the social science of
bias in the context of cases involving individuals or smaller classes.1 24
Importantly, in the case most similar to Wal-Mart itself-a systemic
disparate treatment case pled using a similar evidentiary approach-the District
Court for the Northern District of California upheld plaintiffs' class certification.
In Ellis v. Costco,125 the District Court relied in part on the very implicit bias
research that the Supreme Court had called into question in Wal-Mart to certify
the plaintiffs' class. 126 Approximately seven hundred Costco employees sought
certification for a class action alleging sex discrimination in promotion.' 27 As
part of their case, the plaintiffs introduced expert testimony by sociologist
Barbara Reskin to show "that Costco's culture foster[ed] and reinforc[ed]
stereotyped thinking, which allow[ed] gender bias to infuse the promotion
process from the top down."l 28 She based her testimony on "a social framework
analysis, examining Costco's personnel and promotion policies and practices in
the context of social science literature." 29 The court found Reskin's evidence
"persuasive" to support commonality in the case-"that Costco operate[d] under
a common, companywide promotion system." 30 Yet the Court noted that there
was additional evidence to support such a holding, including a smaller, more
concentrated number of managers involved in promotion decisions. Thus,
"[u]nlike in [Wal-Mart v.] Dukes, the evidence of Costco's culture [was] just one
component among many pieces of persuasive evidence of companywide
practices and policies that support[ed] a finding of commonality."'31
Reflecting upon a recent survey of relevant cases decided in its wake, the
validity and importance of scientific research on implicit bias and stereotyping
123. Results from a Westlaw search conducted August 20, 2016 (within all Key Cite results for
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, all federal cases, search for: "stereotyp!", minus twenty cases already captured in
search described supra note 120). See Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1217, 1228-30 (10th Cir.
2013); Moore v. Publicis Group SA, 1:11-cv-1279 (ALC)(AJP), 2014 WL 11199094, at *3-*8
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2014); Pedroza v. PetSmart, Inc., No. ED CV 11-298-GHK (DTBx), 2013 WL
1490667, at *5-*11 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013); Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civil No. 08-6292
(RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 6256978, at *4-*9 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011).
124. Results from a Westlaw search conducted August 20, 2016 (within all federal cases, decided
since June 20, 2011, search for: ("implicit bias" or "cognitive bias" or stereotyp!) & "Title VII"). For
further discussion of stereotyping and the relationship between implicit bias and stereotyping, see
Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 33, at 938-39.
125. Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 520-21.
126. Id. at 521.
127. See id. at 501.
128. Id. at 520.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 521.
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remains strong, even after the Wal-Mert decision. In Wal-Mart, the Supreme
Court rejected the purpose for which the evidence was used, not the validity of
the evidence itselfl 32-thus leaving the door open for a legal theory that uses
such evidence to create direct entity liability for systemic disparate treatment.
III.
THEORIZING RECKLESS DISCRIMINATION
As described in Part I, each of the three most prominent models of employer
liability for systemic disparate treatment has provided key building blocks for
reaching structural discrimination in the workplace. Yet, to date, federal courts
have not wholly endorsed any of the three. This Part aims to offer an additional
path by theorizing a model for "reckless discrimination," under which an
employer who is sufficiently reckless toward the risk and consequences of
implicit bias in its workplace may, in some circumstances, be liable for
intentional disparate treatment.
A. Intent and Recklessness
Building a framework for "reckless discrimination" requires an
examination of the concepts of intent and recklessness in both tort and
antidiscrimination law, as well as the intersection of the two.133
1. Intent Under Title VII
Since shortly after Title VII's passage, courts and scholars have debated to
what extent the statute requires "intent" to discriminate and how to define
"intent" in this context. Given such vast scholarship,1 34 this Article starts from
the reality that-despite the absence of the word "intent" from the statute's
operative sections and whether right or wrong as a matter of jurisprudence-
federal case law interpreting Title VII disparate treatment currently requires
proof of "intentional discrimination." 35 The question then is how to meet this
"intent" requirement.
132. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,351-62 (2011).
133. While the concept of recklessness appears in criminal law as well, I have omitted a
discussion of criminal recklessness because it is less applicable to employment discrimination. See
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage ofRecklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111, 114 n.7 (2009)
(noting that because of the "so-called rule of lenity," whereby "punitive laws ought to be interpreted to
provide maximum protection to the accused[,] . .. criminal law has a built-in mechanism for
resolving . .. disputes [over] ... the fine lines between recklessness, negligence, and intentional tort"
that tort law lacks).
134. A recent Westlaw search resulted in over 4,600 cases and over 2,100 journal and law review
articles discussing intentional discrimination or intent to discriminate under Title VII, dating back to
1967. Results from a Westlaw search conducted August 20, 2016 (within all federal materials, search
for: (("intentional discrimination" or "intent to discriminate") w/20 "Title VII").
135. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Tort ing EmploymentDiscrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431,
1450-51 (2012) ("There is no principle more basic to Title V1I... than that the disparate treatment
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Reflecting upon the inordinate amount of time and ink devoted to this issue
over the past fifty years, two principles are clear. First, Title VII prohibits many
forms of discrimination without requiring proof of a decision maker's
discriminatory intent.1 3 6 Indeed, only one of the four major theories for proving
unlawful discrimination under Title VII has been interpreted by the Court to
require intent. 137 Second, for the legal theory under Title VII that does require
intentional discrimination-disparate treatment-there is no universal definition
of, and there is more than one way to prove, "intent." 138 By design and
interpretation, proof of "intent" to discriminate under Title VII is a flexible
concept that has been adapted and modernized over time.139
As noted previously, the key text of Title VII that defines unlawful
employment practices makes no mention of intent. 14 0 In the section of the statute
defining unlawful "employer practices," the statue prohibits employers from (1)
discriminating in hiring, firing, compensation, and "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" and (2) limiting or classifying employees or
applicants "in any way which would ... tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or ... adversely affect his status" at work "because
of' the individual's protected classification.1 4 1 in one of the earliest Supreme
Court decisions to interpret and apply Title VII, the 1971 case Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., the Court held that discriminatory effects of employer practices could
be actionable under Title VII even without evidence of the employer's intent to
discriminate. 14 2 As the Court explained, Congress's statutory intent in Title VII
was "plain" from the statute's text: "to achieve equality of employment
theory requires 'intent to discriminate.' The term 'intentional discrimination' appears multiple times in
Supreme Court opinions and has been used literally thousands of times in the lower courts.").
136. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971); Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at
917-25.
137. See infra notes 140-68 and accompanying text.
138. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-10 (1993) (discussing how prima
facie proof will vary); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-06 (1973) (same);
Sullivan, supra note 135, at 1450-51 (describing how the Supreme Court has alternately spoken of
"intent," "motive," "discriminatory purpose," and "animus," when describing the requirement that
disparate treatment be "intentional"); Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and
Proximate Cause, supra note 69, at 38 ("Scholars disagree on whether disparate treatment cases require
a showing of intent, both as a descriptive and a normative matter. Even if it is possible to say that, as a
descriptive matter, courts require plaintiffs to establish intent in disparate treatment cases, this intent
standard is itself inconsistent.").
139. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 66, at 1383, 1396-403 (discussing the challenge of defining
discriminatory intent and noting that, at best, one can only have "a conception or impression of
discrimination" because .'[d]iscrimination' is not a fact in and of itself; it is a narrative, an
interpretation"); Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1243, 1248, 1289-94 (2008).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2012). One reference to intent was added to Title VII by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made compensatory and punitive damages available "against a
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is
unlawful because of its disparate impact)." § 198 1a-(a)(1).
141. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
142. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971).
1078 [Vol. 105:1055
RECKLESS DISCRIMINATION
opportunities and remove barriers that ... operate[]" to advantage one group of
employees over another.1 43 Thus an employer's practices "even neutral in terms
of intent" were not beyond Title VII's reach: "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures .. . that operate
as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability."'" When Congress drafted Title VII, the Court explained, it "directed
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply
the motivation."l 4 5 In this early case establishing what is known as the disparate
impact theory for proving unlawful discrimination, the Court made clear that, in
the statutory text of Title VII as written, Congress did not impose a requirement
of discriminatory intent. 146
Two years later, in 1973's McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the Court
articulated the alternative to disparate impact-the disparate treatment theory of
proof for discrimination, which is now commonly understood to require proof of
an employer's discriminatory intent. 14 7 Where a plaintiff lacks direct evidence
of bias and the employer denies discriminatory motivation, the plaintiff can
prove intent through circumstantial evidence using a three-phase, burden-
shifting mechanism.1 48
First, the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case that would knock out the
most obvious reasons for the adverse employment decision-for example, that
she was unqualified, performing poorly, or did not apply for the job or promotion
(phase 1). 149 The employer can then articulate its legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for taking the adverse employment action against the plaintiff (phase 2),
after which the plaintiff can rebut the employer's assertion as a pretext (phase
3), thus allowing the court to infer discriminatory intent. 50
In two cases decided in 1977, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States and Hazelwood School District v. United States, the Court
explained how a group of plaintiffs alleging a class-wide or systemic claim of
disparate treatment could prove that an employer engaged in a pattern or practice
of intentional discrimination, also through circumstantial evidence.'"' To do so,
plaintiffs must provide statistical evidence documenting a significant disparity
by protected classification in some element of the employer's workforce; if the
143. Id. at 429-30.
144. Id. at 430, 432.
145. Id. at 432.
146. See Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at 919.
147. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 792-93 (1973); see Sullivan, supra note
135, at 1450-51.
148. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 802-04; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 526 (1993).
151. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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employer cannot rebut the statistics or provide an alternative explanation, the
court may infer intentional discrimination.15 2
Over time, as courts continued to interpret and apply Title VII, two
additional theories of proof developed-harassment (considered a sub-type of
disparate treatment) and accommodation-neither of which require proof of
discriminatory intent to establish entity-level liability. 53 Harassment law first
developed in the context of a racially hostile work environment, in which the
Court recognized that harassing an employee on the basis of a protected
classification could amount to disparate treatment in the terms and conditions of
work.1 54 In the 1980s, the Court extended the theory to discrimination because
of sex, first recognizing the quid pro quo form of sexual harassment, and later
extending the hostile work environment theory to any protected classification. 15
In two cases decided in 1998, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton'5 6 and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,5 the Court placed an affirmative duty on
employers to prevent and correct harassment based on a protected class. The
Court established that an employer entity may be held strictly liable for the
harassing behavior of its supervisors regardless of proof of intent, subject to an
affirmative defense.' 58 Where a co-worker or third party perpetrated the
harassment, a plaintiff need only prove employer negligence, still far less than
intent to discriminate. 59 As David Oppenheimer described it, in the context of
harassment doctrine, employer liability is "based not on an intent to do wrong
but rather on a failure to do right."'60
Likewise, for religion and, to some extent, pregnancy, Title VII places a
duty on an employer to affirmatively accommodate employee differences.161
employee may prove disparate treatment in these circumstances by showing the
employer entity failed to meet this duty to accommodate, regardless of any intent
or bias toward the employee's religion or pregnancy. 6 2 These affirmative duties
Title VII places on employers prove that, beyond just disparate impact,
discriminatory intent is decidedly not required to establish certain forms of
liability.'6 3 Thus, of the four major theories for proving unlawful discrimination
152. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 325,339; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-09,361; see also Selmi, supra
note 116, at 500-01(describing application of this theory to the Wal-Mart case).
153. See Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at 936, 944.
154. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing "landmark case" of Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 454 F.2d 234
(1971)).
155. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
156. 524 U.S. 775, 780, 792 (1998).
157. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
158. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791-92, 798, 804; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756, 765.
159. See Zatz, supra note 64, at 1364.
160. See Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at 950.
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), (k) (2012).
162. See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2028, 2031-32 (2015); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1342 (2015).
163. See Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at 950, 967; Zatz, supra note 64, at 1374-75.
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under Title VII-disparate treatment, disparate impact, harassment, and failure
to accommodate-the Court has interpreted only disparate treatment to require
intent.
In disparate treatment cases, proof of intent to discriminate can be
established using circumstantial evidence to disprove the employer's claim that
it lacked discriminatory intent. This proof structure opens the door for a
definition of intent that goes well beyond a decision maker's conscious choice
to act in a biased manner.1 64 If, for example, a supervisor assumes incorrectly
that a male employee is better suited for a promotion than a female employee,
the female employee may prove intentional discrimination even though the
supervisor would say he did not intend to disadvantage the female candidate.' 6 5
In this way, "intent to discriminate" under Title VII can include an intentional,
volitional act that results in discriminatory consequences-what Noah Zatz
identified as "class membership enter[ing] the causal chain." 66 What is more,
after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII, a plaintiffs protected
classification need not be the only explanation for the adverse employment
action: it must only be a "motivating factor" in a claim of disparate treatment.1 67
Thus a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment may now articulate what Michael
Zimmer described as a "chain of inferences leading to a finding of
discrimination."168
Court decisions focused on the issue of discriminatory intent under Title
VII bear out this broad and flexible approach. A plaintiff may prove intent to
discriminate under Title VII by offering evidence that the decision maker's stated
reason for the adverse action is not entitled to credence.' 69 The court may infer
discriminatory intent because the employer's stated reason is untruthful or
inaccurate-for example, the person selected for the promotion was not,
objectively, more qualified than the plaintiff. Alternatively, the court may infer
discriminatory intent because, even if truthful, the stated reason did not actually
motivate or does not justify the adverse action-for example, the employer fired
the plaintiff for a seemingly trivial reason.1 70
164. See Krieger, supra note 50, at 1176.
165. See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 582-84, 591 (7th Cir. 2004) (reducing punitive
damages but upholding a jury verdict in favor of a female plaintiff who was passed over for promotion
"because she had children and [her supervisor] didn't think she'd want to relocate her family, though
she hadn't told him that").
166. See Zatz, supra note 64, at 1377.
167. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §2000e (2012)); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 90 (2003).
168. See Zimmer, supra note 139, at 1243, 1266.
169. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
170. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000)
("A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by showing that the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2)
did not actually motivate the defendant's challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the
challenged conduct."); Zimmer, supra note 139, at 1272.
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In one recent case, a plaintiff survived summary judgment on his claim of
intentional race discrimination by showing that his minor dispute with a co-
worker did not justify his termination from a job he had performed for nine
years.1 7 1 In another, a Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict for a plaintiff on
her claim of intentional sex discrimination where she showed that she did, in
fact, have her paramedic's license, despite her employer's claim that not
obtaining the license led to her suspension and ultimate termination. 172
In a class-wide disparate treatment case, a court infers that an employer is
engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination when the employer
fails to rebut or explain away the plaintiffs' statistical proof.17 3 In a recent case
decided after Wal-Mart v. Dukes, plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining certification
for a pattern-or-practice intentional sex discrimination class based on their
statistical evidence that the employer's culture and practices of discretionary
promotion decisions resulted in qualified women receiving disproportionately
fewer promotions than men-evidence that the employer's expert could not
explain away satisfactorily.1 74 In this way, the intent requirement for alleging
disparate treatment under Title VII is more accurately described as an "inferred
intent" requirement: courts have never required a Title VII plaintiff to provide
either direct proof or proof of animus to succeed on an "intentional" disparate
treatment claim.175
To be sure, at least some members of the current Roberts Court would likely
reject this characterization of inferred intent. As described in Part II, above, and
as Michael Selmi has observed, the Court majority in Wal-Mart v. Dukes may
have raised the bar for what is needed to prove a pattern or practice of intentional
discrimination, beyond just statistics and anecdotal evidence that support an
171. Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank, 785 F.3d 230, 241 (6th Cir. 2015) ("A jury could reasonably
conclude that each of the rationales proposed by the defendant for its decision to fire [the plaintiff] either
had no basis in fact, did not actually motivate the defendant's decision, or was insufficient to warrant
the challenged conduct. [The plaintiff] thus has ... raised the specter that those rationales were merely
pretextual.").
172. Smith v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 588 Fed. App'x 965,977-78 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he
jury could have inferred that the City's reasons for [plaintiffJ's termination were pretextual. The City
justified [her] suspension, which then led to her termination, by stating that she was no longer qualified,
but evidence at trial indicated that [she] could have continued working as a firefighter/EMT and that she
presented her EMT license to the City.").
173. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-10 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977).
174. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 522-28 (N.D. Cal. 2012). After
plaintiffs succeeded on class certification, defendants agreed to settle the case for $8 million. See Abigail
Rubenstein, Costco Agrees to Pay $8M to End Sex Bias Class Action, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2013, 3:20
PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/496932/costco-agrees-to-pay-8m-to-end-sex-bias-class-action
[https://perma.cc/RH8T-MK49].
175. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03 (1973). But see Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking
Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 1303-04, 1330, 1340-43 (1995) (suggesting that Title VII
and the Fair Housing Act need a new, explicit standard, which she also describes as "inferred intent," to
be able to reach unconscious race discrimination).
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inference of discrimination.1 76 Justice Scalia was notoriously hostile to the
disparate impact theory of liability under Title VII except as a way to "smoke
out" hidden intentional discrimination,177 a position shared by like-minded
Justices on the current Court.178 In the context of Equal Protection doctrine, the
Court defines intentional discrimination as more purposive and does not
recognize a disparate impact theory of discrimination against governmental (as
opposed to private) actors.1 79 Scholars have noted the potential for such
skepticism to impact the Court's vision of intent under Title VII doctrine as
well."so
That said, based on the actual statutory text of Title VII-which sweeps
more broadly than the Equal Protection clause 8 -and decades of precedent
interpreting and applying it, "intent to discriminate" under Title VII is its own
animal. Proving intentional disparate treatment under Title VII requires no more
than showing that a protected classification entered into the process of an adverse
employment decision-a showing that can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence.
2. Intent and Recklessness in Tort Law
Because of its connection to an employer's behavior toward applicants and
employees, the concept of intent in Title VII bears resemblance to issues of
negligence, intent, and recklessness in tort law. The basic tort of negligence
allows plaintiffs to recover for damages when they are owed a duty of care that
176. See supra Part II.A; Selmi, supra note 116, at 500-01.
177. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595-96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) ("It might be possible to defend the law [of disparate impact] by framing it as simply an
evidentiary tool used to identify genuine, intentional discrimination-to 'smoke out,' as it were,
disparate treatment.... But arguably the disparate-impact provisions sweep too broadly to be fairly
characterized in such a fashion."); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354-55 (2011)
(Scalia, J., writing for the majority) ("[L]efl to their own devices most managers in any
corporation... would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that
produce no actionable disparity at all.").
178. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Comtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2526-28 (2015) (Thomas, J. dissenting) ("We should drop the pretense that Griggs' interpretation of
Title VII was legitimate.... Under any fair reading of the text, there can be no doubt that the Title VII
enacted by Congress did not permit disparate-impact claims."); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.) ("The way to stop discrimination on the basis
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.").
179. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273, 276 (1979); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976).
180. See Sullivan, supra note 135, at 1452-53 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 269) (citing Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009)) (describing how many scholars believe the Court carries over its
Equal Protection jurisprudence on intent to the context of Title VII, including the view of
"discriminatory purpose" as acting with "more than intent as volition or... awareness of
consequences"--as acting "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of ... adverse effects upon an identifiable
group").
181. Compare the thirteen-word Equal Protection Clause's "No state shall... deny to any
person ... the equal protection of the laws," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, to the 13,000-word full
statutory scheme enacted by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
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has been breached. 18 2 Establishing negligence requires a plaintiff to prove the
elements of duty, breach, causation (both in fact and proximate), and damages.183
Where a party owes a general duty of care to another, it is a "duty of reasonable
care under the circumstances." 1 84 A breach giving rise to liability for negligence
occurs where the party owing the duty "falls short of such care," by, for example,
"conduct that is unreasonably risky."s85 To prove that the breach caused the
damages giving rise to the claim, a typical tort plaintiff must prove that the
breach was both the "cause in fact," without which there would be no harm, and
a reasonably foreseeable "proximate cause" that bears some relation to the
resulting harm.1 86 Requiring both "but for" and proximate cause means that "the
defendant's conduct not only in fact caused the plaintiff s harm but that it was a
reasonably significant cause," as opposed to the harm being an unforeseeable
"fortuitous" result of negligence or the defendant's conduct being an
insignificant cause among other more significant causes. 187
As described in Part I, some legal scholars, most notably David
Oppenheimer, have articulated a theory of employment discrimination as
negligence: Title VII creates a duty on employers to prevent discrimination, so
when discrimination occurs, the employer has breached this duty and is liable. 8
As Oppenheimer convincingly demonstrates, Title VII jurisprudence reflects the
view that employers have clear duties in the context of claims alleging sexual
harassment, accommodation, and even disparate impact.189 For individual and
class disparate treatment claims, however, the affirmative duty on employers is
less clear. Because disparate treatment has been characterized as "intentional"
discrimination, courts have yet to adopt the negligence framework, holding,
instead, that disparate treatment requires more than mere negligence on the part
of the employer.1 90
The most obvious alternative comparison in tort, then, is the higher
standard of purposefulness required to make out an "intentional tort." Under the
182. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 (WEST 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 281-82 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
183. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 114.
184. Id. § 115.
185. Id. § 115(1).
186. Id §§ 114-15. While I use this simplified definition of "proximate cause" for clarity and
ease, note that even within tort law itself it has been defined and applied inconsistently. See Sperino,
Discrimination Statutes, the Common La, and Proximate Cause, supra note 69, at 6-10.
187. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 115.
188. See Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at 967; Zatz, supra note 64, at 1364; supra Part I.A.
189. See Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at 967-69; supra Part I.A.
190. See Sperino, The Tort Label, supra note 69, at 1075 (citing Aaron v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
No. 3:08CV1471, 2009 WL 803586, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009); Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4 F.
Supp. 2d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)) ("To date, the courts have not embraced arguments that plaintiffs
may establish a discrimination claim via a negligence analysis."); see also Jalal, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 241
("Title VII... provides no remedy for negligent discrimination."); Aaron, 2009 WL 803586, at *2
(being "merely 'negligent' . . . does not rise to the standard of intentional discrimination required by
Title VII.").
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Third Restatement of Torts, to be guilty of an intentional tort-for example,
battery-a tort victim must show that the person committing the tort acts either
"with the purpose of producing that consequence" or "knowing that the
consequence is substantially certain to result." 91 Intentional torts can arise even
if the tortfeasor did not set out to accomplish the results of the tort: if the
tortfeasor goes ahead with his action, despite knowing that its "consequences are
certain, or substantially certain to result," then "he is treated by the taw as if he
had in fact desired to produce the result." 9 2 Like intent in Title VII, intent in tort
focuses on a specific subjective state of mind that is proven through inference
from objective evidence, 193 and intentional torts require neither a bad motive nor
consciousness that an act is a legal wrong.' 94
Yet the "substantial certainty" test for tortious intent sets a significantly
higher bar than the inferred intent allowed in Title VII disparate treatment. As
torts scholar Dan Dobbs explains, "even a very high risk" that a consequence
will occur is not enough for an intentional tort, which requires that the specific
harm against the plaintiff was substantially certain at the time and place it
occurred.1 95 Intent and negligence in tort are also "mutually exclusive" and
opposed concepts: intent focuses on the actor's purposeful state of mind in taking
an act rather than on any consideration of the outward act itself.1 96 For example,
if a driver hits a mailbox, he may only be liable of an intentional tort if he veered
off the road on purpose to hit the mailbox or knowing that it was substantially
certain he would do so, otherwise he may be negligent; he cannot be both. In
contrast, discrimination under Title VII reflects and incorporates both
concepts-a concern for both the action and the motivation.
Because of its narrow focus on purposeful state of mind, tortious intent fails
to capture the full range of inferred intent allowed in Title VII disparate treatment
claims.1 97 This mismatch invites comparison to what serves as a middle ground
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2005); accord DOBBS, supra note
182, § 124.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, cmt b (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2005) ("[K]nowledge that harm is
substantially certain to result is sufficient to show that the harm is intentional even in the absence of a
purpose to bring about that harm."). Because of the relative newness of the Third Restatement of Torts
and the fact that it, "while accepting the ... definition of intent incorporated into § 8A of the Restatement
Second of Torts, differs from [it]" slightly, id. at cmt A, I refer to both versions of the Restatement in
my discussion of intent.
193. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 24.
194. Id. § 25.
195. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 24; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1, cmt. e ("The
applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to situations in which the defendant has
knowledge to a substantial certainty that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to
someone within a small class of potential victims within a localized area.").
196. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 26.
197. Other scholars may disagree with my formulation here and characterize the concept of intent
in tort to be broader-not narrower-than intent in Title VII. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Let's Pretend
Discrimination is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1114-17 (2014). For my discussion of this issue, see
infra Part UI.C.
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in tort law: recklessness. In tort, reckless conduct falls somewhere between
intentional and negligent conduct, reflecting pieces of both categories.' 98 While
recklessness "adds a degree of confusion or uncertainty" to tort law that makes
it an unpopular topic,199 this characteristic mirrors the lack of clarity about the
meaning of "discriminatory intent" in Title VII, making it, ironically, an apt
comparison.
Recklessness in tort goes further than negligence to account for situations
in which the actor takes risks that are unusually high and for which the costs of
preventing the harms are low.200 As defined in the Third Restatement of Torts,
recklessness occurs where an actor "knows of the risk of harm created by the
conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to another in the person's
situation" and the burden to "eliminate or reduce the risk" is "so slight relative
to the . .. risk" that the actor's "failure to adopt the precaution[s]" demonstrates
the actor's "indifference to the risk." 20 1 To prove recklessness requires that the
actor was aware of a significant risk and "proceed[ed] without concern" for the
impact on others. 20 2 Recklessness incorporates a state of mind or "mental
element" of "conscious indifference" to the consequences of one's actions: the
actor "intentionally or consciously runs a very serious risk" of harming the
victim "with no good reason to do so." 203 Because of this, to be reckless, the
tortfeasor must have had "reason to know or notice" of the risks of harm that
they consciously ignored- "information that would lead directly to an inference
of the relevant facts or conditions" (as compared to the lesser negligence
standard of "should have known").2 04
It is this state of mind element that makes recklessness more like intent than
like negligence-so much so that, in some instances, recklessness meets the
required mental state for an intentional tort. To be reckless, an act "must be
intended by the actor," even though "the actor does not intend to cause the harm
198. See Rapp, supra note 133, 116-18; DOBBS, supra note 182, § 27.
199. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 27; see Rapp, supra note 133, at 115 (noting that "recklessness
has remained one of the murkiest standards in tort," and "has rarely been the subject of academic
analysis"). To be sure, within tort law and scholarship itself, there is mixed sentiment and confusion
over the standard of recklessness and its comparison to related concepts of gross negligence or willful
or wonton conduct See id at 127-31, 133-35. Despite this lack of complete certainty in tort law, the
concept of recklessness provides a useful counterpoint to explore the meaning of "intent" in disparate
treatment.
200. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 147 (noting that "the risk-utility balance strongly disfavors the
defendant's conduct-the risk was high, or very serious harm was threatened, or the cost of avoiding
danger was very low").
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
202. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 27.
203. Id. § 147 & n.13 (citing Bader v. Lawson, 898 S.W.2d 40 (Ark. 1995); Morris v. Leat 534
N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1995); Campbell v. City of Elmira, 644 N.E.2d 993 (N.Y. 1994)).
204. DOBBS, supra note 182, at 351 n. 12 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12
(1965)). See, e.g., Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1995) (defining recklessness as acting "in
disregard of a risk known to or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it"), as cited in
DOBBS, supra note 182, § 147, at 351 n.13.
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which results from it." 2 0 5 Thus, even though recklessness is not, by definition,
intentional, "in extreme cases courts may treat [it] more like an intentional tort
than like negligence."206 Moreover, a finding of recklessness may be enough in
tort to create liability for punitive damages207 -damages that are only available
under Title VII in cases of intentional discrimination.20 8
In particular, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires
a mental state that may be met by an actor's recklessness. The Third Restatement
of Torts defines this tort as:
An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional harm to another is subject to liability
for that emotional harm and, if the emotional harm causes bodily harm,
also for the bodily harm.2 0 9
In explanatory comments, the Restatement authors note that "[c]ourts uniformly
hold that reckless conduct, not just intentional conduct, can support a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional harm.' 210 Likewise, a typical state common
law definition of the required mental state for this intentional tort requires the
tortfeasor to act with "intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability
of causing emotional distress." 211 Given that the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress often arises in employment discrimination litigation,2 12 the
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt f (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
206. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 147 & n.14 (citing Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R Co., 641 N.E.2d 402
(Ill. 1994)) ("sometimes more like negligence, sometimes more like intent'); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. b ("In emotional-harm cases,... a finding of recklessness may subject a
defendant ... to liability for intentional infliction of emotional harm."); Rapp, supra note 133, at 122-
25, 136-37 (discussing when recklessness suffices to serve as an intentional tort). "At times, it is difficult
for courts to distinguish recklessness from intentional tort. Recklessness has been described as
'tantamount to' or a 'proxy for' intentional misconduct. In his judicial writings, Richard Posner has
described recklessness as having such a close proximity to intentional torts that they are virtually
indistinguishable, and are treated indistinguishably by the law. Courts have emphasized that a reckless
defendant must 'intentionally do the act or intentionally fail to do the act' which causes harm, meaning
that the defendant must make a choice of a 'course of action that spells danger."' Rapp, supra note 133,
at 136 (citation omitted).
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § cint. b ("[T]he standard for awarding punitive damages
commonly refers to the defendant's reckless conduct-or reckless indifference to risk, or reckless
disregard for risk.").
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012) ("In an action brought by a complaining
party ... against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) ... the complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages . . . .").
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 (emphasis added).
210. Id.§46cmt.h.
211. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 66-67 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (emphasis added).
212. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. n ("Claims of intentional infliction of
emotional harm arise with some frequency in the workplace. Some of those claims overlap with federal
and state civil-rights statutes that prohibit certain forms of discrimination, including harassment."); L.
Camille H6bert, Conceptualizing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a Dignitary Tort, 75 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1345, 1352-54 (2014) (citing case law and explaining how discrimination and harassment
claims have been "likened to" or plead with claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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fact that recklessness constitutes "intent" in the tort context lends additional
support for considering how recklessness might apply in the context of Title VII.
3. The "Tortification" ofEmployment Discrimination Law
Looking to the tort concept of recklessness as a means for theorizing
liability for disparate treatment requires addressing a recent body of thought on
what Charles Sullivan and Sandra Sperino, in separate works, refer to as the
"tortification" of employment discrimination law.2 13 Since the 1970s, in a
handful of cases interpreting Title VII, courts have drawn analogies between
statutory antidiscrimination protections and tort law.214 When Congress enacted
Title VII, it created a statutory right to be free from discrimination at work, above
and beyond the common law of tort. Yet Title VII allows plaintiffs to recover
damages for civil wrongs; as such, some courts perceived Title VII to bear a
resemblance to common law tort claims for personal injury, like intentional
infliction of emotional distress.2 15 While references to tort law appeared on
occasion throughout Title VII jurisprudence, the comparisons were, for the most
part, just that: parallels or analogies, suggesting that Title VII was "tort-like,"
but not that it was a tort.216
In the era of the Roberts Court, however, this changed. In a series of three
cases decided between 2009 and 2013, the Court applied tort law concepts more
actively and directly to cases alleging discrimination or retaliation at work, thus
"tortifying" the law of employment discrimination. 217 First, in 2009, in Gross v.
FBL Financial Services, Inc., a divided Court rejected the mixed-motive theory
of liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), instead
requiring a plaintiff to prove that age was the "but for" cause of the adverse
employment action.2 18 With no direct reference to tort law-other than one string
cite that referenced Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts-the Court reasoned
that the "motivating factor" theory of proof available under Title VII was not
similarly available under the ADEA, which Congress had failed to amend in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.219 Thus, unless Jack Gross could prove that his age
was the cause in fact for his demotion when his employer gave his duties to a
213. Sperino, The Tort Label, supra note 69, at 1054; see Sullivan, supra note 135, at 1431.
214. See Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at 917-19 (citing, for example, United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229, 254 (1992); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974)); Sperino, The Tort Label,
supra note 69, at 1052, 1054, 1067 (same).
215. See Oppenheimer, supra note 54, at 917-19; Sperino, The Tort Label, supra note 69, at
1054.
216. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 254 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I remain of the view that
Title VII offers a tort-like cause of action."), cited in Sperino, The Tort Label, supra note 69, at 1067.
217. See Martha Chamallas & Sandra F. Sperino, Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and
Conflict: Symposium Introduction, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1021, 1021-22 (2014); Sperino, The Tort Label,
supra note 69, at 1052 (describing a "radical shift in the prominence and importance of tort law within
discrimination jurisprudence"); Sullivan, supra note 135, at 1431-34.
218. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173-80 (2009).
219. Id.
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younger employee as part of a "corporate restructuring," he was not entitled to
prevail.220
After joining the four-Justice dissent (which argued that the majority
misconstrued Congressional intent to treat the ADEA like Title VII), Justice
Stephen Breyer wrote a second dissent to address the majority's improper tort
approach. 22 1 "[I]t is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show 'but-for'
causation ... [in a] context [where] reasonably objective scientific or
commonsense theories of physical causation" apply, Breyer wrote, but "it is an
entirely different matter to determine a 'but-for' relation when we consider, not
physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that constitute motive."222
Two years later, in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Court continued its
application of tort causation theories to employment claims, this time in the
context of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(USERRA).22 3 Vincent Staub alleged that his employer discriminated against
him because of his obligations as a U.S. Army Reservist when his supervisor,
who resented Staub's unavailability, targeted Staub in a series of baseless
22disciplinary actions.224 Because of the supervisor's complaints and Staub's
disciplinary record, the vice president of human resources fired Staub for poor
performance.225
The Supreme Court held that the vice president need not have acted as an
unwitting "cat's paw" for the supervisor, because Title VII required only that
Staub's military status be "a motivating factor" for the adverse employment
action. 226 In so doing, the Court explained that it was relying on the tort law
concept of "proximate cause," stating that they were operating "from the premise
that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort
law." 227 Thus the Court, in its own words, "incorporate[d] [a] traditional tort-law
concept" directly into antidiscrimination law to justify its holding.228 The Court
also noted that USERRA "is very similar to Title VII," 2 29 opening the door to
further application of similar tort concepts.
While, in Staub, the Court's application of tort seemed to expand the reach
of USERRA to protect employees, the other shoe dropped two years later when,
building upon Gross and Staub, the Court applied tort law "but for" causation to
220. See id. at 169-73, 176.
221. See id. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
224. Id. at 413-15.
225. Id. at 414-15.
226. Id. at 414-22.
227. Id. at 417.
228. Id. at 420.
229. Id. at 417.
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Title VII directly. In University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar,230
the Court rejected the mixed-motive theory of proof for retaliation claims under
Title VII.23 1 As it had done in Gross for the ADEA, the Court held that the
inclusion of the "motivating factor" approach in Title VII's discrimination
provision did not extend to Title VII's retaliation provision.232 As a result, unless
Naiel Nassar could prove that retaliation for his complaints of religious and
national origin discrimination were the "but for" cause for his constructive
discharge from his position as a hospital doctor, he could not prevail.233
Unlike in Gross, however, this time, the Court's reliance on tort law was
front and center. In two prominent paragraphs devoted to explaining how
"[c]ausation in fact ... is a standard requirement of any tort claim," which
"includes federal statutory claims of workplace discrimination," the Court
described "but for" causation as "textbook tort law," "the background against
which Congress legislated in enacting Title VII," and "the default rule[]
[Congress] is presumed to have incorporated." 234 Indeed, the acceptance of the
application of tort law was so complete that even Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the four dissenters, used tort law to argue her position-not that the Court was
wrong to apply tort causation concepts to Title VII but that the Court applied
those tort concepts incorrectly.235
The full impact of the recent trio of cases applying tort concepts more
directly to antidiscrimination doctrine remains to be seen. Most legal scholars
considering this move by the Court view it as a mistake-either because it is an
incorrect mismatch of legal doctrines, or because it is unnecessarily limiting to
the reach of Title VII, or both.236 On the other hand, some commentators
recognize that tort concepts have been beneficial to the interpretation of
employer duties under antidiscrimination statutes and acknowledge the potential
for tort ideas to broaden certain aspects of Title VII doctrine.237 Because both
230. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013); see also Sullivan,
supra note 135, at 1431 (suggesting "that, rather than widening the notion of discriminatory intent,
which Staub at first blush seems to do, the opinion actually adds another layer to the plaintiffs burden").
231. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2522-23.
234. Id. at 2524-25.
235. Id at 2546-47.
236. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Tortifing Retaliation: Protected Activity at the Intersection of
Fault, Duty and Causation, 75 OHo ST. L.J. 1375, 1398-401 (2014) (mismatch); Martha Chamallas,
Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315,
1330-32 (2014) (mismatch); William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About the Tortzfication of
Employment Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1028-32 (2014) (both); Sperino, The Tort
Label, supra note 69, at 1052-53 (mismatch); Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to the Method?:
Torts and Other Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OIO ST. L.J. 1079, 1080483 (2014)
(both); Sullivan, supra note 135, at 1459 (both).
237. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Tort and Contract Law Issues,
75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225, 1261-62 (2014); Corbett, supra note 236, at 1068-76; Hdbert, supra note 212,
at 1362; Catherine E. Smith, Looking to Torts: Exploring the Risks of Workplace Discrimination, 75
OmIO ST. L.J. 1207, 1215-16, 1219-22 (2014); Laura Rothstein, Disability Discrimination Statutes or
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areas of law are complex and multifaceted, whether it is harmful or helpful to
import tort concepts into antidiscrimination doctrine often turns on which
concepts are being imported.
Most of the scholarly concern about tortifying antidiscrimination law
relates to issues of causation. As described previously, tort law usually requires
that a defendant's conduct was both the actual cause-the cause in fact of the
harm, but for which the harm would not have occurred-and the proximate
cause-a reasonably foreseeable and not insignificant cause-of the harm.2 38 in
stark contrast, causation under Title VII requires only that a protected
classification be "a motivating factor" of the harm-neither the only but-for
cause, nor an anticipated proximate cause. 239 Thus, as legal scholars have rightly
identified, applying tort law causation concepts to antidiscrimination cases
significantly ups the ante of what plaintiffs must prove to show that the adverse
employment action in question was "because of' their protected classification.240
This appears to be what the Supreme Court did: it required but-for causation for
ADEA and Title VII retaliation claims in Gross and Nassar, and it suggested that
proximate cause would be an appropriate consideration in USERRA claims in
Staub.241
Relative to concerns about causation issues, less attention has been paid to
the issue of intent in tort and its application to intentional discrimination under
Title VII. Where scholars have weighed in, opinions are mixed. Again, some,
including Sperino, raise concerns about mismatch between the two doctrines,
arguing that intent in tort and intent in employment discrimination are
conceptually and doctrinally different ideas.242 Some view a move to import tort
intent into intentional discrimination as potentially limiting Title VII's reach. For
example, Sullivan cautions that, in Staub, the Court appeared to "disaggregate"
intent and motive, paving the way for it to now require plaintiffs to prove both
under antidiscrimination statutes. 243 Thus where intent may be proven fairly
easily by consequences from volitional acts, motive implies an underlying
discriminatory motivation that may be more difficult to prove.244
Tort Law: Which Provides the Best Means to Ensure an Accessible Environment?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J.
1263, 1299-301 (2014); Sperino, supra note 197, at 1114-24; Sperino, The Tort Label, supra note 69,
at 9.
238. See supra notes 218-35 and accompanying text.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); see Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-102
(2003).
240. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, supra note
69, at 1459; Sullivan, supra note 135, at 1459-67.
241. See supra notes 218-35 and accompanying text; see also Sperino, The Tort Label, supra
note 69, at 1064-65.
242. See Sperino, The Tort Label, supra note 69, at 1074-75 (suggesting that such a comparison
"ignores two important factors: whether individual disparate treatment cases actually require a showing
of intent and whether the intent required is similar to the type required in intentional tort cases").
243. See Sullivan, supra note 135, at 1451-55.
244. See id.
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On the other hand, while remaining skeptical on causation, Sperino and
others acknowledge potential advantages to looking to tortious intent.245 For
example, as described more fully in Part III, below, if applied to its full logical
conclusion, adopting tort concepts of intent in Title VII offers the potential to
reach more structural forms of discrimination.246 In particular, an incorporation
of tort concepts into Title VII should, at the very least, open the door to revisiting
an employer's duty to not discriminate under Title VII. If Title VII is just another
tort, then an employer entity and its agents must take reasonable care not to
discriminate-which begs the question of what, if anything, that standard now
requires.
Interestingly, in the handful of antidiscrimination cases it has decided since
Nassar in 2013, the Court has arguably strengthened employer duties under Title
VII in line with a negligence framework while referring less explicitly to tort
doctrine or authority. In two cases decided in 2015, EEOC v. Abercrombie &
Fitch247 and Young v. UPS,248 the Court held in favor of employee plaintiffs,
expanding an employer's duty to accommodate employees' religious differences
and pregnancy disabilities under Title VII.
In Abercrombie, the Court noted that discrimination "because of' a
protected classification "typically imports, at a minimum, the traditional
standard of but-for causation," but also that "Title VII relaxes this standard" by
prohibiting adverse employment decisions when a protected class is merely a
"motivating factor." 249 Thus, when Abercrombie refused to hire Samantha Elauf,
who wore a hijab, after assuming she could not comply with its "look policy" of
no hats or headwear, it engaged in disparate treatment, despite the fact that it
lacked "actual knowledge" that Elauf would need a religious accommodation.250
Moreover, contrary to Abercrombie's assertion that Elauf's claim must be raised
as a disparate impact claim, the Court held that, because the protected
classification of "religion" is defined by Title VII to include "religious
observance and practice, as well as belief," a failure to accommodate a religious
practice constitutes disparate treatment.251
In Young, the Court made it easier for employees to prove intentional
disparate treatment under Title VII's requirement that an employer treat pregnant
employees "the same as" all other employees with similar work capabilities or
limitations. 252 A plaintiff can reach a jury, the Court held, "by providing
245. See, e.g., Hbert, supra note 212, at 1362-63; Smith, supra note 237, at 1209-16; Sperino,
supra note 197, at 1114-20.
246. See, e.g., Hdbert, supra note 212, at 1352-55; Smith, supra note 237, at 1209-16; Sperino,
supra note 197, at 1116-18.
247. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
248. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
249. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2032-34.
250. Id. at 2031-34.
251. Id at 2032-34.
252. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1351-56.
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sufficient evidence that the employer's policies impose a significant burden on
pregnant workers, and that the employer's 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory'
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather-when
considered along with the burden imposed-give rise to an inference of
intentional discrimination." 253 The Court went on to explain that this framework
"is consistent with our longstanding rule that a plaintiff can use circumstantial
proof' to make out her case; for example, proof "that an employer's general
policy and practice with respect to minority employment-including
statistics[-]could be evidence of pretext." 2 54
What seems clear at this point is that the Court has incorporated tort
concepts, particularly those around causation, into antidiscrimination
jurisprudence, while not entirely adopting a tort approach. Regardless of
scholarly concerns about the lack of fit between the two fields and the limiting
impact of tort law on statutory civil rights laws, to some extent, the ship has
already sailed in Gross, Staub, and Nassar. Given this reality, if the Court is
willing to look to tort causation concepts when interpreting Title VII, it can look
to tortious intent, too.
B. Knowledge of the Risk ofBias in Employment Decisions
Once it is established that intent under Title VII may parallel intent and, in
some cases, recklessness in tort, the next analytical step is to assess the
foreseeability of bias as a result of current structures of employment decision
making. If intent arises when an actor acts despite knowing that "the [harmful]
consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act," 255 or
when he has "conscious indifference" to the harmful consequences of his
256
actions,26 the focus of the inquiry becomes assessing how well known the risk
is that bias may infect subjective employment decision making.
This Section documents that this risk is now so widely and pervasively
known that, when an employer becomes aware of disparities by gender or race
in its workforce, a failure to respond to the situation amounts to conscious
indifference. First, six decades of social science research has documented again
and again how bias infects common patterns of employment decision making,
resulting in discriminatory outcomes and inequality. Second, this research is so
established that, for at least the past two of those six decades, many employers
have voluntarily and publicly adopted bias-prevention measures to counteract
the known impact of bias-so much so that successful intervention measures are
now well known. What is more, technology has made bias-reducing
interventions cheaper and easier to adopt than ever before. Yet the law of Title
VII still lags behind current scientific knowledge and modern business practices.
253. Id. at 1354.
254. Id. at 1355 (internal quotation marks omitted).
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
256. DOBBS, supra note 182, § 147.
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1. Social Science Research on Bias
Scientific research documenting that stereotypes and biases disadvantage
minority group members in the workplace predates Title VII. As early as the
1930s, social psychologists identified and began measuring and studying the
phenomenon of racial prejudice. 25 7 Research continued at a rapid pace
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, producing what Linda Krieger described as "a
mind-dazzling number of definitions of prejudice" and culminating in the 1954
publication of Gordon Allport's The Nature ofPrejudice.2 58 While early research
on prejudice linked it with the notion of stereotyping, biased decision making
was still viewed as a conscious, motivated act.259
Then, in the late 1950s and 1960s experimental social psychologists began
to connect the dots between our human tendency to categorize information
automatically and those underlying stereotypes. In a series of experiments during
this time, researchers first documented a "cognitive approach to intergroup bias,"
whereby the normal mechanisms our brains use to categorize information "might
in and of themselves produce and perpetuate intergroup bias," regardless of
motivation. 26 0 Thus, even before Title VII was enacted in 1964, researchers had
identified what is known today as cognitive or implicit bias: prejudice that occurs
automatically as a result of the brain's normal tendency to categorize between
members of in-groups and out-groups.
Since the 1970s, researchers in an array of fields, including social
psychology, industrial-organizational psychology, sociology, neuroscience, and
more, have built upon early social cognition theory. 26 1 Such research has
documented countless aspects of the operation of stereotypes and biases based
on protected status characteristics like race, sex, national origin, and religion-
along with its potential to be corrected.2 62 The depth and breadth of the research
is so vast that it is hard to quantify. In her germinal 1995 article The Content of
Our Categories, Krieger cited over 125 different major studies on social
257. See Krieger, supra note 50, at 1175 (citing GARDNER MURPHY, LOIS BARCLAY MURPHY
& THEODORE M. NEWCOMB, EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1931); Daniel Katz & Kenneth
Braly, Racial Stereotypes of One Hundred College Students, 28 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 280
(1933); JOHN DOLLARD ET AL., FRUSTRATION AND AGGRESSION (1939); JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND
CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN (1937)).
258. See Krieger, supra note 50, at 1176 (citing GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE (1954)).
259. Seeid.at 1187.
260. See id. at 1186-87 (citing three key early studies: Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of
Contrast as Composite Habit, 53 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 (1956); Henri Tajfel & A.L.
Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgement, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104 (1963); W. Edgar
Vinacke, Stereotypes as Social Concepts, 45 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 229,229 (1957)) (emphasis removed).
261. See generally DOBBIN, supra note 16 (describing the development of this research); Frank
Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Origins and Effects ofCorporate Diversity Programs, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF DIVERSITY AND WORK 253-81 (Quinetta M. Roberson ed., 2013) (same); Krieger,
supra note 50 (same).
262. See supra note 261.
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cognition theory published between 1956 and 1995.263 The research has grown
exponentially in the two decades since: today, tens of thousands of studies have
been published on cognitive, implicit, or unconscious bias, over 1,200 of which
focus on cognitive bias in employment discrimination alone.264
In addition, the phenomenon of implicit bias has now entered the
mainstream lexicon with help from scientists Anthony Greenwald, Mahzarin
Banaji, and Brian Nosek's Project Implicit at Harvard University.265 Now almost
twenty years old, the Project made widely available an online "Implicit
Association Test" that allows the website's visitors to test their own implicit
biases based on a wide array of group membership dimensions, including race,
gender, national origin, disability, age, and sexuality. 26 6 The researchers' work
has been covered by many major news sourceS267 and was recently compiled into
a book incorporating the data collected by the Project over its first decade and a
half.268 Implicit bias has also entered the public discourse on policing and
criminal justice reform through the concept of "racial profiling" and the Black
Lives Matter movement.269 Societal understanding of implicit racial bias is now
so widespread that 2016 presidential candidate Hillary Clinton referred to it in
her campaign materials,2 70 and a moderator of one 2016 presidential debate
asked both candidates whether they "believe that police are implicitly biased
against black people."271
The vast body of scientific research developed over the past sixty years now
supports some universal principles about stereotyping and implicit bias that
263. See Krieger, supra note 50, at 1187-218.
264. Searches conducted August 20, 2016, in Google Scholar for works published since 1995
with the term "cognitive bias," "implicit bias," or "unconscious bias" returned 18,900; 10,800; and 9,600
results respectively. With each of those terms and "employment discrimination," the search returned
1,250; 1,390; and 1,060 results respectively.
265. About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edulimplicit/aboutus.html
[https://perma.cc/L5FR-UYCD] (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
266. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html
[https://perna.cc/NB39-CM6Y].
267. Reaction, BLINDSPOT, http://blindspot.fas.harvard.edu/Reaction [https://perma.cc/7MHA-
SUWD] (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
268. MAHzARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF
GOOD PEOPLE (2013).
269. See, e.g., Radley Balko, The Black Lives Matter Policy Agenda Is Practical, Thoughful-
and Urgent, WASH. POsT (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2015/08/25/the-black-lves-matter-policy-agenda-is-practical-thoughtful-and-urgent
(https://perma.cc/2E68-GCT2].
270. Criminal Justice Reform, HILLARY FOR AM.,
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/ZC5H-RTBX] (last
visited Apr. 17, 2017) (acknowledging that "implicit bias still exists across society" and proposing to
"tackle [implicitbias in policing] together" bypromising to "commit $1 billion in [Clinton's] first budget
to find and fund the best training programs, support new research, and make this a national policing
priority").
271. Presidential Debate at Hofstra University in Hempstead, New York, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.cdu/ws/index.phppid=1 18971
[https://permacc/NH5H-VFF5].
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relate to employment decision making. First, people hold stereotypes about
others based on group membership-for example, based on race or sex-that
can be positive, negative, or neutral.272 Second, people often act on those
stereotypes automatically, as a part of their brain's sorting function, without their
conscious awareness.273 Third, automatic stereotypes can shape perceptions,
such that the same record or performance (for example, a resume or performance
on a job task) may be viewed differently when it is associated with people with
different status characteristics (for example, a man or a woman, a white person
or a black person). 274 They can also lead to shifting criteria for that performance,
such that valued criteria (for example, a candidate's level of education or,
alternatively, experience) change to match whichever criteria the higher-status
candidate has.275 Fourth-and most importantly, for employer liability under a
recklessness framework-while this process may happen automatically, it is not
inevitable: it can be controlled and corrected.276
While experts may disagree about the role such research should play in
employment litigation, the dispute is not over the validity of the research findings
themselves.277 Specifically, there is agreement on the last of these four findings:
implicit bias can be counteracted, interrupted, or corrected to prevent or reduce
its impact on employment decisions.2 78 It is this finding that has led to a cottage
industry of experts and businesses designed to help employers reduce bias in
their workplaces.
2. Employer Behavior to Reduce Bias
Alongside the development of social science research on bias, since the
1960s, employers have engaged in voluntary efforts to reduce discrimination and
promote diversity in their own operations. 279 The types of policies and practices
272. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 50, at 1187-218 (citing and summarizing in detail the social
science on implicit bias); Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social
Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness "Defense, 7 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 401, 442 (2003) (citing and summarizing in detail the social science on stereotyping).
273. See supra note 272.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Compare Hart & Secunda, supra note 81, at 51-55 ("[T]here is in fact a substantial
agreement among scientists about the operation of cognitive processes like bias and stereotyping[;
thus critics' concerns] go[] to the weight a fact finder should place on the evidence, not to whether
the evidence is admissible in the first instance."), with Monahan et al., supra note 85, at 1715-19,
1742-49 ("If experts ... simply described social science findings on the circumstances under which
gender stereotyping is more or less likely to occur within the research settings, leaving it to the fact-
finder to determine the applicability of this research to the circumstances of a particular employer, such
testimony would be entirely consistent with... our [concept of] social frameworks [and their legal
role].... In many cases, however, experts have not been content to provide a description of the general
research to create a context for the facts of the case, and judges have not required such circumspection.").
278. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 50, at 1216-17; Williams, supra note 272, at 442.
279. See Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 261, at 253-73.
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employers may adopt have changed and evolved over time, mirroring advances
in social science research and responding to measures of existing programs'
effectiveness. 280 Importantly, as Lauren Edelman and her colleagues have
identified, because Congress did not prescribe particular measures for employers
to take to achieve statutory antidiscrimination goals, the practices that employers
and their human resources personnel developed have helped shape the limits of
Title VII. 281 As such, employer awareness of and involvement in preventing and
correcting for biases dates as far back as the passage of the statute.
As Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev have documented, employers'
efforts to prevent discrimination and promote diversity evolved through a series
of phases. 282 In the 1960s, employers focused on establishing nondiscrimination
policies and diversifying their recruitment efforts to create a more diverse
pipeline of potential applicants and employees. 283 In the 1970s, efforts focused
on systematizing hiring and promotion decisions to make them more objective.
For example, employers began creating job postings and descriptions and
establishing complaint procedures for employees. 284 This was followed by a
period in the 1980s, when a new literature developed that promoted the "business
case" for diversity by encouraging employers to diversify their workforces as a
way to remain economically competitive in an increasingly diverse society.285
This period also saw the growth of trainings on diversity topics and programs to
expand mentorship and networking opportunities for minority employees.286 In
the 1990s, as both the proportion of women in the human resources profession
and liability for sexual harassment grew, employers shifted their focus to training
and policies to prevent harassment and improve work-family balance.287 And, by
the mid-1990s and early 2000s, the science on implicit bias made its way into
discussions of workplace diversification efforts and discrimination
prevention.288 Focused on the sociological finding that even automatic
stereotypes can be controlled or counteracted, researchers proposed methods for
280. Id at 253-54.
281. Lauren Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized
Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. Soc. 888, 888-91 (2011); Lauren Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller &
Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization ofLaw, 106 AM. J. Soc. 1589, 1589-93
(2001); see also Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 261, at 254-55 (discussing Edelman and her colleagues'
work).
282. Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 261, at 253-54.
283. Id. at 256-59.
284. Id. at 259-65.
285. Id. at 265-69.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 269-73.
288. See, e.g., Bielby, supra note 47, at 120-29; Reskin, supra note 47, at 319-28; Barbara F.
Reskin & D.B. McBrie, Why Not Ascription? Organizations' Employment of Male and Female
Managers, 65 AM. Soc. REV. 210,210-33 (2000), cited in Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 261, at 263.
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doing so, including creating accountability within organizations and monitoring
the results of employment decisions for biased effects.2 89
As voluntary employer efforts evolved over time, researchers also tracked
their success. A variety of studies have documented the efficacy of each of these
types of interventions to change either individuals' attitudes or the composition
of workforces. 290 Dobbin and his colleagues' research on workforce composition
documents that more dispersed efforts to alter people's views through diversity
training, evaluations, or increased bureaucracy have been less successful than
concrete interventions backed by institutional authority, such as active diverse
recruiting, management-level responsibility for mentoring, and staff devoted to
diversity efforts. 29 1 Social psychologists and sociologists tracking efforts around
implicit bias have determined that, while changing the implicit attitudes of
individuals may be difficult, interventions that seek to reach the entity or
organizational level-rather than prevent individual decision makers from acting
on implicit bias--can be effective. Examples include efforts to reign in the
operation of subjective decisions and to provide oversight that connects
employment decisions to workforce demographics. 292 While this means that
there is no one-size-fits-all solution and that successfully reducing the operation
of stereotyping and implicit bias may depend on the organizational context, 29 3 it
still means that employers can and should do something to address the
phenomenon within their workplaces, rather than turn a blind eye.
289. See, e.g., ROBERTD. GATEWOOD&HUBERTS.FELD,HUMANRESOURCE SELECTION (5th
ed. 2001); HERBERT G. HENEMAN III, ROBERT L. HENEMAN & TIMOTHY A. JUDGE, STAFFING
ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1997), cited in Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D in Support ofPlaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification at 23 n.56, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (No. C-012252 MJJ).
290. See, e.g., DOBBIN, supra note 16 (citing dozens of such studies); Dobbin & Kalev, supra
note 261, at 254-76 (same); Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best
Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC.
REv. 589, 589-617 (2006).
291. Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 261, at 273-76.
292. See William T. Bielby, The Challenge ofEffective Interventions 5 (2013) (conference paper,
Gender & Work: Challenging Conventional Wisdom), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/conferences/2013-
w50-research-symposium/Documents/bielby.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQX5-DSPR] (citing BANAJI &
GREENWALD, supra note 268, at 152; Calvin K. Lai, Kelly M. Hoffman & Brian A. Nosek, Reducing
Implicit Prejudice, 7 SoC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 315 (2013)) ("[T]he IAT researchers
often advocate organizational interventions, ranging from completely removing race and gender from
the decision-making process when feasible (as in blind orchestra auditions) to reducing subjectivity and
discretion in the criteria for making decisions about hiring, promotion, job assignment etc. and
establishing oversight and accountability for adhering to objective standards.").
293. See Bielby, supra note 292, at 10 ("There is a consensus among psychologists and
organizational sociologists about how habits of mind intersect with organizational policies, structures,
and practices to create and sustain workplace gender bias. That consensus supports a formalist
intervention strategy based on the idea of constraining discretion and establishing oversight and
accountability for how personnel decisions are made and for their impact on gender and racial equity in
the workplace. But that kind of intervention is easier to advocate, implement, and institutionalize in
some organizational contexts than in others.").
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Over the past five years, academic research centers, including those at
business schools, have made major strides in operationalizing the research on
implicit bias to help businesses reduce its impact on their workforces. Harvard's
Project Implicit now has an entire consulting arm that provides experts to consult
with businesses on, among other things, "applications of implicit bias to
organizational practice" and on "developing or evaluating interventions and
programs for human resource management." 2 94 The Center for WorkLife Law at
the University of California, Hastings College of the Law has a project working
with corporate partners to develop and pilot a system of "Metrics-Driven Bias
Interrupters" 295-a project that Center director and law professor Joan C.
Williams described in a 2014 article in the Harvard Business Review.2 96
Likewise, under the direction of sociologist Shelley Correll, Stanford
University's Clayman Institute for Gender Research developed a program called
"See Bias/Block BiasTM" that provides employers workshops and toolkits that
offer concrete steps for identifying and stopping bias from impacting
performance assessments.29 7 In 2015, Harvard Business School launched the
Gender Initiative to advance gender equity in business and leadership, for which
one identified goal is to "challenge discrimination, stereotypes, [and] implicit
biases" that limit both men and women. 2 98 In addition, for more than a decade,
many large law firms have served as intermediaries between researchers and the
business sector by offering their own information and training on implicit bias
to clients and other lawyers.299
294. Project Implicit Consulting, PROJECT IMPLICIT,
https://www.projectimplicit.net/consulting.html [https://perma.cc/JE2P-8DFW] (last visited Apr. 3,
2017). Project Implicit also has a training services group, through which it provides certified trainers to
provide training customized to the organization's business sector and goals. Lectures and Training,
PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicitnet/lectures.html [https://perma.cc/VF4H-H4C9] (last
visited Apr. 17, 2017).
295. CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, supra note 8; We Help Companies Interrupt and Correct
Implicit Bias in the Workplace, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, http://biasinterrupters.org
[https://perma.cc/36DT-7ETG] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
296. See Williams, supra note 8.
297. Blueprint for Change, CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP,
https://womensleadership.stanforcedu/blueprint [https://perma.cc/R3BV-5AGY] (last visited Apr. 17.
2017) ("See Bias/Block Bias: Our interactive workshops focus on solutions for effective management.
Over 90 minutes, we introduce the concept of bias as a structural issue within organizations. We then
lead participants through interactive exercises to illustrate how to block bias in hiring, performance
evaluations and team dynamics.").
298. Harvard Business School Launches Gender Initiative, HARV. BUS. SCH., (May 18, 2015),
http://www.hbs.edu/news/releases/Pages/hbs-launches-gender-initiative.aspx [https://perma.cc/FCV7-
A5C4]; Gender, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/initiatives/Pages/gender-initiative.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6VTF-EBQ2] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
299. See, e.g., Maureen Minehan, EEOC Targets Unconscious Bias, HR WIRE (May 22, 2007)
(discussing EEOC efforts to highlight unconscious bias in employment); EEOC Launches Initiative to
Educate on Changing Forms of Race Discrimination, 13 HR COMPLIANCE LAW BULLETIN ART. 19
(Apr. 15, 2007) (same); How to Limit Your Firm's Exposure to Employee Lawsuits, 03-12
COMPENSATION & BENEFITS L. OFF. 4 (Dec. 2003) (discussing unconscious bias in law firm practice);
Pedro A. Noguera & Susan K. Springborga, Increasing Diversity in Law Finn, 13 LEGAL MGMT. 53
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Moreover, technology has now made it easier and more affordable than
ever for companies to reduce the harmful effects of bias in their decision-making
processes, while still operating with discretion. For example, the Center for
WorkLife Law's website, Biasinterrupters.org, provides free information,
worksheets, and toolkits with small, concrete steps that employers can
implement-"tweaks to basic business systems (hiring, performance
evaluations, assignments, promotions, and compensation) that interrupt implicit
bias in the workplace, often without ever talking about bias." 300 Proven
interventions can be as simple as pre-committing to criteria for evaluating
candidates for a promotion, requiring specific examples to support a performance
appraisal overall rating, having multiple people review resumes for hiring, and
reviewing compensation rates to spot demographic disparities. 301
Technology has also provided a wide array of "blinding" screens for use in
hiring and promotion. One approach is to use an algorithm programmed to detect
set objective hiring qualifications as a first line sorter of job applicants rather
than a person, in an effort to improve or diversify hiring.302 Scientific evidence
supports the potential success of this approach: researchers from the Universities
of Minnesota and Toronto conducted an "analysis of 17 studies of applicant
evaluations" that documented "that a simple equation outperforms human
decisions by at least 25%" in accurately predicting the job and academic
performance of applicants. 303 According to the New York Times, the promise of
algorithms has led to "a new wave of startups" that have focused on "ways to
automate hiring," including Doxa, Entelo, Guild, Textio, and GapJumpers. 304
(Sept/Oct. 1994) (same); Christine Steiner, PerformanceAppraisals-Reducing LegalRisks, C579 AM.
L. INST. - AM. B. Ass'N CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 427 (Mar. 20,1991) (raising unconscious bias as
something to prevent when conducting employee performance appraisals). In recent versions of these
efforts, one major employer-side law firm now offers data analytics services to its clients, see Littler Big
Data Initiative, LITTLER, https://www.littler.com/service-solutions/littler-big-data-initiative
[https://perma.cc/YG9S-QSE2] (last visited Apr. 3, 2017), and another offered a continuing legal
education program to lawyers on preventing implicit bias in their own law practice, see What You Don 't
Know Can Hurt You: Unconscious Bias In Law Practice-How to Recognize and Interrupt, JACKSON
LEWIS, https://www.jacksonlewis.com/event/what-you-dont-know-can-hurt-you-unconscious-bias-
law-practice-how-recognize-and-interrupt [https://perma.cc/RBD8-BRTU] (last visited Apr. 14, 2017)
(noting a June 2016 continuing legal education training on "how unconscious bias can impact the
workplace and the practice of law," including "how to recognize our own unconscious biases and
practical ways to interrupt them to make better decisions").
300. We Help Companies Interrupt and Correct Implicit Bias In The Workplace, CTR. FOR
WORKLIFE LAW, supra note 295.
3 0 1. Id.
302. Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?, N.Y. TIMEs (June 28,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshotlcan-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html
[https://perma.cc/2LBU-JNS8].
303. Nathan R. Kuncel, Deniz S. Ones & David M. Klieger, In Hiring, Algorithms Beat Instinct,
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/05/in-hiring-algorithms-beat-instinct
[https://perma.cc/TZF5-NJE9] (describing Nathan R. Kuncel et al., Mechanical Versus Clinical Data
Combination in Selection and Admissions Decisions: A Meta-Analysis, 98 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1060,
1060-72(2013)).
304. Miller, supra note 302.
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The use of technology to improve hiring decisions has spread to even
"[e]stablished headhunting firms like Kom Ferry," which are now "incorporating
algorithms into their work, too." 305
One technology-based hiring firm, Infor Talent Science, reported that their
algorithmic software and predictive model led to "an average increase of 26
percent" in African-American and Latino hires "across a variety of industries
and jobs"-with a 31 percent increase in Latino hires for their clients in the
wholesale sector and 60 percent increase in African-American hires for their
restaurant sector clients. 306 Another startup, Unitive, recently received $7.5
million in seed money to design a "hiring platform created to tackle unconscious
bias in corporations," with a particular focus on using "pre-commitment" to
hiring criteria to resolve the bias problem of shifting standards. 307
Beyond screening, some companies are using the blinding ability of
technology for other parts of their hiring and evaluation process. For example,
inspired by Goldin and Rouse's research on blind orchestra auditions, British
website-hosting company ByteMark adopted an anonymous application process
for system administrator positions that maintained the anonymity of their
applicants through several rounds of the hiring process.3 08 After applicants
submitted anonymous applications online they participated in skills tests
remotely and two rounds of interviews by online instant message chat.309
Interviewers posed questions that applicants answered through text messages. 310
The final round of hiring was conducted by in-person interview." While, due
to a small sample size, ByteMark was unable to say reliably that the anonymity
improved its diversity, it reported that the anonymous process drew far more
applications than they would normally receive, and that they benefitted from the
process, which they plan to continue. 312
305. Id.
306. Bourree Lam, For More Workplace Diversity, Should Algorithms Make Hiring Decisions?,
ATLANTIC (June 22, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/algorithm-hiring-
diversity-HR/396374 [https://perma.cc/AFM2-A2JD].
307. Valentina Zarya, Startup Tackling Unconscious Bias Raises $7.5 Million in Series A
Funding, FORTUNE (Nov. 13, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/13/unconscious-bias-unitive
[https://penna.cc/89QZ-U3HY]; see Bryce Covert, People Can't Be Trusted To Make Unbiased Hiring
Decisions. So This Woman Created A Computer Program, THINK PROGRESS (May 13, 2015),
https://thinkprogress.org/people-cant-be-trusted-to-make-unbiased-hiring-decisions-so-this-woman-
created-a-computer-program-33e47d5d058e [https://perma.cc/R7KQ-TZT3].
308. Matthew Bloch, Bytemark Is Hiring, by Anonymous Interview, BYTEmARK BLOG (May 20,
2015), https://blog.bytemark.co.uk/2015/05/20/bytemark-is-hiring-by-anonymous-interview
[https://perma.cc/5K5U-XLKK].
309. Id.; see also Phil Johnson, How One Tech Company Fights Hiring Bias with Anonymous
Recruitment, ITWORLD (July 29, 2015), http://www.itworld.com/article/2953817/careers/how-one-
tech-company-fights-hiring-bias-with-anonymous-recruitment.html [https://perma.cc/S6BH-CRHX].
310. See Bloch, supra note 307.
311. See How We Hire, BYTEMARK, https://careers.bytemark.co.uk/process
[https://perma.cc/9APW-2W5M].
312. See Johnson, supra note 309.
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Another approach incorporates "gamification" into the hiring process by
using anonymous simulations or video-game style challenges to the job
application process. 3 13 The startup GapJumpers in particular focuses on using
anonymity and gamification in the hiring process to reduce implicit bias. 3 14 The
organization, which modeled itself on the competition television show "The
Voice" (the 2017 equivalent of blind auditions for orchestras), provides "an
online technology platform that enables hiring managers to hold blind audition
challenges," in which "job applicants are given mini assignments that are
designed to assess the applicant for the specific skills required for the open
position."315 According to GapJumpers, "[a]bout 60 percent of the top talent
identified through [its] blind audition process come from underrepresented
backgrounds."316
Of course, incorporating technology into hiring is neither a panacea for
reducing implicit bias nor a one-size fits-all solution, as it may be particularly
well-suited for technology-sector employers. There is also a serious risk that
biasing features could be programmed inadvertently into an algorithm, or that an
employer may feel overly confident that the technology has solved the
problem. 317 A recent literature has begun to warn of the potential risks of
collecting and incorporating data into employment decisions as, itself, a possible
driver of discrimination.318 That said, the growth of the cottage industry of bias-
reducing tools targeted at employers-and the major start-up money being
invested in such ventures-shows that the problem of implicit bias is now such
a well-known and significant concern among the business sector that it has
become profitable to address.
313. See Ken Gaebler, The Future ofHiring: Human Resources, Without the Humans, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.corn/business/archive/2012/02/the-future-of-hiring-human-
resources-without-the-humans/252518 [https://perma.cc/3XTU-GWQ8]; Aid Ito, Hiring in the Age of
Big Data: Online Games and Quizzes Are a New Way to Judge Job Applicants, BLOOMBERG (Oct 24,
2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-24/new-way-to-assess-job-applicants-
online-games-and-quizzes [https://perma.cc/KKQ7-3PDJ]; Don Peck, They're Watching You at Work,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-
at-work/354681 [https://perma.cc/TPF8-GPWC]; Catherine Rampell, Your Next Job Application Could
Involve a Video Game, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 22, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/magazine/your-next-job-application-could-involve-a-video-
game.html [https://perma.cc/MFN3-YFGBJ.
314. Cooper, supra note 9.
315. Id; see also GAPJUMPERS, supra note 9 (offering clients the ability to "discover great talent
'The Voice' way").
316. Cooper, supra note 9.
317. Miller, supra note 302; Lam, supra note 306.
318. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 677, 694-712 (2016); danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data, 15
INFO. COMM. & Soc'Y 662, 666-68 (2012); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 884-92 (2017).
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C. Reckless Discrimination
As described previously, some legal scholars have suggested that Title VII
should, and under some legal theories does, reflect a negligence model of
liability, whereby an employer who fails to meet its duty to prevent
discrimination at work violates the statute. 319 While negligence concepts appear
throughout statutory antidiscrimination jurisprudence, particularly under legal
theories of proof for harassment and failure to accommodate claims, 320 federal
courts have yet to adopt a negligence approach to disparate treatment.321 This
failure stems from federal courts' characterization of disparate treatment claims
as requiring proof of "intentional discrimination."3 22 Yet the requirement of
"intent" was read into the doctrine of Title VII by the courts, not drafted into the
text of Title VII by Congress.323
What is more, the Supreme Court itself allows employees to prove inferred
discriminatory intent in disparate treatment claims through circumstantial
evidence (anecdotal, comparative, statistical, or other) that creates an inference
of discrimination by discrediting the employer's justification for its adverse
employment actions. 324 This Section argues that, so constructed, the burden to
prove intentional disparate treatment under Title VII should be met by an
employer's knowing and reckless disregard for the operation of implicit bias and
stereotyping in its workplace. After constructing a theory of "reckless
discrimination" under Title VII, this Section addresses potential
counterarguments and comparisons to prior theories.
1. Reckless Disregard for Implicit Bias as Intent under Title VII
As scholars identifying the tortification of employment law have
documented, recent decisions by the Roberts Court have changed the prior
relationship between tort and antidiscrimination law.325 Where the Court once
drew parallels and analogies between the two fields, it has now described
antidiscrimination law as "a federal tort," and has adopted and applied tort
319. See supra Part I.C.
320. See supra Parts IC, U.A.3.
321. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, supra note
69, at 13-14 ("To date, the courts have not embraced negligent discrimination as a basis for liability.");
Sperino, The Tort Label, supra note 69, at 1074-75 ("It is at least possible to state that most intentional
discrimination cases, at least descriptively, are not negligence cases. To date, the courts have not
embraced arguments that plaintiffs may establish a discrimination claim via a negligence analysis.").
322. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, supra note
69, at 13-14 & n.80 (quoting Aaron v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 3:08 CV 1471, 2009 WL 803586, at
*2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009) (stating that where 'Defendant was merely 'negligent' in its hiring
practices, [that] does not rise to the standard of intentional discrimination required by Title VH"'); id.
(quoting Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("'Title VII. . .provides no
remedy for negligent discrimination ....
323. See supra Part .A.1.
324. See id.
325. See supra Part HI.A.3.
2017] 1103
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
causation concepts directly into interpretations of the ADEA, USERRA, and
Title VII retaliation claims. 3 26 Having done so, it is then doctrinally incoherent
for the Court to fail to extend tort concepts of intent to Title VII as well327 -
concepts that have the potential to help modernize Title VII and extend its reach
to more stubborn forms of discrimination harder to redress under current
doctrine.328
While remaining skeptical about the Court's move to apply tort law to Title
VII, several scholars have recognized that the limitations created by tort
causation may be counterbalanced by the expansion created by tortious intent.329
Without prescribing any particular recommendation for how to do so, Catherine
Smith considered the theoretical possibilities of "regulating implicit bias in the
workplace by cautiously turning to tort law." 330 Expressing concern that "we
should avoid treating Title VII as the equivalent of a common law tort without
appreciating their different purposes and objectives," Smith looks to tort
principles that reflect our societal belief in encouraging duty and reducing risk
separate from and regardless of moral culpability.3 31 This, she suggests, explains
why Title VII should recognize liability for implicit bias, despite the "hyper-
focus[] on discriminatory intent and a seek-and-find-the-'bad-actor' framework"
that the courts have read into Title VII doctrine.332 Noting that "what constitutes
discrimination has continually evolved and should continue to do so," Smith
poses, but stops short of answering the question, "Is it feasible to regulate
implicit bias by rooting out the risks of discrimination?" 333
More concretely, Sandra Sperino's thought experiment, pushing the bounds
of what the Court really means when it applies tort law to antidiscrimination law,
unearths similar possibilities. 334 Sperino identifies that, if Title VII was truly a
tort, "[r]eplacing an intent standard with a causation standard makes it possible
to prove cases of unconscious or structural discrimination" as disparate
326. See id.
327. See Sperino, supra note 197, at 1116-18.
328. But see Sullivan, supra note 135, at 1476-77 (expressing concern that proximate cause ideas
of foreseeability "may oust cognitive bias from discrimination jurisprudence"). "As applied to cognitive
bias, how foreseeable is it to the decisionmaker that he might be influenced by unconscious influences?
Almost by definition, the decisionmaker is unaware of the wellsprings of his conduct-they are,
therefore, not actually foreseen. But perhaps they were foreseeable-if not by the decisionmaker himself
then by the employer. This is all [that is] require[d] for liability for negligence, and much current
scholarship on employer liability for cognitive bias is rooted in seeking to have employers take
reasonable steps to debias the workplace." Id. at 1477 (citing Green, A Structural Approach as
Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, supra note 87, at 897-98; Oppenheimer, supra
note 54, at 900).
329. But see Sullivan, supra note 135, at 1450-55 (expressing concern that, in Staub, the Court
"disaggregated" tort motive and intent in a way that, if applied to Title VII, could make it more difficult
for a plaintiff to prove "intentional discrimination").
330. See Smith, supra note 237, at 1208.
331. See id. at 1208-09.
332. See id.
333. See id. at 1209-10.
334. See Sperino, supra note 197, at 1117.
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treatment. 335 Citing to the examples of non-blind orchestra auditions,
compensation decisions based on prior salaries, and subjective promotion
decisions like those alleged by the Wal-Mart plaintiffs, Sperino argues that
liability would be proved by "transferring the concept of intent to the entity
context." 336 And, "[i]f courts are required to presume that Congress was
legislating against a common law backdrop," she suggests, then "the standard
tort definition of intent [should] appl[y] in discrimination cases"-meaning that
a Title VII plaintiff need only prove that her employer "believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from the action." 337 This, Sperino
suggests, "would be an important innovation," that would also "help the courts
to see a way in which they have not been careful about conceptualizing
[discriminatory] intent."3 3 8
This Article pushes Smith and Sperino's suggestions further. Given the lack
of clarity on "intent" in Title VII, the breadth of circumstantial evidence allowed
to show "intentional" discrimination by inference, and the fact that recklessness
suffices to establish some intentional torts, it is possible to extend the comparison
between tort and antidiscrimination law beyond just tortious intent to tortious
recklessness.
As applied to intentional disparate treatment under Title VII, the
recklessness approach would offer a way to bolster an employer entity's
responsibility for the widespread operation of implicit bias in its workplace.
Drawing upon the negligence and organizational context models, a recklessness
analysis would focus on the employer entity's failure to act with sufficient care
in creating the context and organizational structures within which employment
decisions are made. Of course, tortious intent is conceived of as an individual
concept, which makes it an odd fit with systemic discrimination at an entity level.
It is this conceptual disconnect that led the Court in Wal-Mart to view the
vicarious social framework model as merely aggregated individual harms,
supervisors' individual decisions for which the entity could not be held
responsible. 339 Yet to the extent that the theory of systemic disparate treatment
exists at all, as it has for forty years since the Teamsters and Hazelwood cases
recognized pattern-or-practice discrimination,3 40 those at the top of the
organization who set the employment practices used and the culture within which
those decisions are made can and should be held responsible where those
practices and cultures perpetuate the expression of implicit bias.
As such, plaintiffs seeking to use a recklessness approach would pursue
their case like any other pattern-or-practice case of systemic disparate treatment.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 1116-19.
337. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965)) (internal
modifications and quotation marks omitted).
338. See id. at 1119.
339. See supra notes 104-06,112-13 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 96-97, 151-52 and accompanying text.
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They would introduce statistical, anecdotal, and social science evidence to show
that the subjective decision-making system in question created a disparity by
protected class under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
Any evidence demonstrating that a uniform approach or culture in the workplace
fostered implicit bias or stereotyping would be most helpful. Recklessness can
bridge the gap, however, where plaintiffs have difficulty producing such
evidence and courts, following Wal-Mart, view the defendant employer as a
mere "conduit" for individual supervisors' biases. 341 By positing that the
employer entity was not just negligent but, in fact, reckless about the operation
of implicit biases in its midst, plaintiffs unmask the "innocent" institution and
make it easier for a court to infer intentional discrimination.
Because recklessness is composed of two elements, plaintiffs should
introduce additional evidence on both, which would help the court infer
discrimination. First, plaintiffs would show that the employer "[knew] of the risk
of harm created by the conduct" or had knowledge of "facts that make the risk
obvious to another in the person's situation." 342 As detailed above, sixty years of
data on implicit bias and stereotyping and decades of employer efforts to
counteract it show that the possibility of implicit bias in subjective decision
making is an obvious risk for employers. 343 In particular, lawyers have been
warning employers of the risks of implicit bias for over a decade.344 While
evidence that the specific employer in question received information or advice
on the risk of bias infecting subjective employment decisions would likely be the
strongest, plaintiffs could also present evidence showing a common
understanding of such risks within the employer's industry or among its
competitors. To show "conscious indifference" to this risk, however, would also
require statistical or anecdotal evidence that suggest to the employer that implicit
bias may be impacting its own employment decision-making structures. This
type of proof should not be onerous, as it has always been and would always be
required in any systemic disparate treatment case: plaintiffs collect relevant data
through discovery and then provide expert analysis that shows statistically
significant disparities by protected class.345
Second, the plaintiff would show that the burden to "eliminate or reduce
the risk" is "so slight relative to the . . . risk" that the actor's "failure to adopt the
precaution[s]" demonstrates the actor's "indifference to the risk." 3 46 As detailed
above, the vast cottage industry of diversity experts and new bias-reducing
technology have greatly reduced the cost and burden of adopting structures to
341. See supra notes 104-06, 112-13 and accompanying text; GREEN, supra note 97, at 74-84
(describing the "conduit" view).
342. See supra Part UI.A.2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
343. See supra Part m.B.1.
344. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
345. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336-43 (1977); Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 306-09 (1977).
346. See supra Part Jl.A.2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2.
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interrupt implicit bias in the workplace.347 To be a "slight" burden relative to the
risk would also require an analysis of the particular employer's decision-making
structures, size, budget, and related factors. Again, evidence on the specific
employer's ability to act-or willingness to act on other unrelated issues of a
similar cost-would be the plaintiffs strongest evidence. Evidence of effective
bias-reducing measures adopted by the employer's industry or competitors
would also be instructive. In essence, the circumstances would show that the
employer entity was so consciously indifferent to the operation of implicit bias
in its decision-making structures that its intent to discriminate can be inferred.
Even under a recklessness model, this proof structure makes it possible that,
to be found reckless, an employer would need both to be sizeable and to rely on
subjective decision making that results in noticeably disproportionate outcomes.
Yet that's not nothing: under a recklessness model, it may be possible to hold
accountable large employers who have the means to reduce implicit bias, but
perpetuate it by failing to act.348 And the increased specter of liability among
large employers could reverberate out to reach smaller employers who may take
efforts to avoid similar liability.
It is important to note that a theory of reckless discrimination is neither
proposed with the goal of, nor would it have the effect of, ending discretionary
decision making in employment. Allowing supervisor discretion to make
decisions about hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, and more is a
universally adopted employment practice without which most employers would
be unable to operate. A recklessness theory of liability would merely improve
upon discretionary decision making by creating an incentive for employers to
pay attention to how that discretion is being exercised in their workplaces. It
would also motivate employers to correct for any bias they perceive in their
decision-making structures before it leads to claims of discrimination. Even in
the given examples of employers using technology to remove biasing
information from their hiring processes,349 all of the ultimate decisions were
made by supervisors exercising their discretion. The point of the interventions
was to prevent bias from impacting the way in which that discretion is applied;
as a result, some employers reported that the de-biasing intervention led them to
make better decisions.350
2. Counterarguments and Comparisons
A theory of reckless discrimination is not a magic answer to the limits of
existing antidiscrimination law, and it suffers from its own limitations. The most
obvious criticism, likely from adherents to the late-Justice Scalia's skepticism
about holding employers liable for "societal discrimination," is that "reckless"
347. See supra Part EI.B.2.
348. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
349. See supra Part l.B.2.
350. Id.
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behavior is not "intentional" behavior. While this may be true under a narrow
reading of case law that interprets Title VII disparate treatment as requiring
intentional discrimination, the operative text of the statute itself never uses the
word "intent." Actionable discrimination requires merely that an adverse
employment action be "because of' a protected class. Moreover, in recent years
Justice Scalia and his fellow skeptics have interpreted Title VII to be, in effect,
a federal tort.35 1 Taking a coherent and consistent approach to Title VII in the
wake of the tortification cases requires that, if tort causation now applies to Title
VII, tort intent should, too. Thus, where recklessness suffices to commit an
intentional tort, it should certainly suffice to meet the "inferred intent" standard
actually required by Title VII case law. 352
A second criticism, likely from the opposite camp, is that adopting a tort
approach to discriminatory intent heightens what plaintiffs are required to prove
under the statutory text of Title VII. Indeed, such a criticism is warranted: since
the Teamsters and Hazelwood cases in the 1970s, all that has ever been required
for a plaintiff to prove systemic disparate treatment is enough unrebutted
statistical and anecdotal evidence to create an inference of discrimination.
Importing new expectations that a plaintiff show an employer's "knowledge of'
and "conscious indifference" to the risk of biased decision making limits the
broad reach of Title VII that Congress intended. There is, indeed, a risk of
opening up Title VII to an unnecessarily limiting interpretation and, what is
worse, to creating an unintended affirmative defense for employers who argue
that they lacked knowledge or resources to remedy an obvious problem in their
organization for which they should not be held liable. Yet there is also a risk of
doing nothing to push Title VII to reach the operation of implicit bias. The
tortification ship has sailed,353 and, after Wal-Mart, federal courts are
increasingly unwilling to draw an inference of widespread discrimination based
on individual supervisors' decisions. 3 54
Perhaps the strongest reason for considering the frame of recklessness is a
normative one: in a post-Wal-Mart world where it is increasingly difficult to
create an inference of organization-wide discrimination, calling attention to the
fact that an entity has the knowledge and resources to prevent implicit bias
infecting its operations, yet fails to do so, may be the moral imperative courts
need to make Title VII reach its full potential.355 The theory of reckless
351. See supra Part 11.A.3.
352. See supra Part lH.
353. See supra Part EIt.A.3.
354. See supra Part H.A.
355. For example, Justice Anthony Kennedy raised a different, but somewhat related, concept
during oral argument in Wal-Mart when he questioned the parties' attorneys about the relevance of a
"deliberate indifference" standard--drawn from Section 1983 and Title IX cases against governmental
entities-in the private employment context. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 1131405, at *6, *40. But see Deborah M. Weiss,
A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 Yale J.L. & Feminism 119, 157-161 (2012)
(characterizing the oral argument questions as a missed opportunity for plaintiffs to argue for a "notice-
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discrimination offers a new way to frame and redress the wrong of entrenched
discriminatory bias in the workplace-a way that is pragmatic, realistic, and (like
most compromises) imperfect.
CONCLUSION
It has been fifty years since Title VII was enacted to prohibit protected class
discrimination in employment-fifty years during which social scientists have
amassed an inordinate amount of research on the operation of bias in
discretionary decision making and how to reduce its impact. For most of the time
since Title VII's enactment, its jurisprudence developed and advanced,
simultaneously advancing gender and racial equality in the workplace. In the past
decade, however, this advancement has stalled-both in the workplace and in
the courts. Yet embedded bias in workplace decision-making structures remains,
and is particularly apparent in the still unexplained disparities in compensation
and leadership in many industries and businesses. This Article proposes a new
model for conceptualizing the harm of systemic discrimination: as recklessness
by an employer entity.
Allowing liability for reckless discrimination is, of course, a thorny
proposition. As many scholars have noted, it remains questionable whether
continuing to apply tort concepts into antidiscrimination law is a good idea.356 It
is more questionable, still, whether--despite the ability to do so under the
existing jurisprudence of Title VII-federal courts would recognize a theory of
reckless discrimination. 357 And, if they were to do so, it will still require plaintiffs
to prove that their employers acted recklessly.
based negligence" approach); Pippen v. Iowa, 854 N.W.2d 1, 18-19 (Iowa 2014) (same, citing Weiss,
supra). Applying a deliberate indifference standard directly to private employment is highly
problematic, both because the standard was developed in the context of limiting the liability of
governmental actors and, as Tristin Green has identified, because of its focus on vicarious liability for
individual acts rather than direct entity liability. See Green, The Future ofSystemic Disparate Treatment
Law, supra note 87, at 429-32. To the extent that remedying the wrong of indifference to discrimination
appeals to the Court, however, a reckless discrimination framework, which draws on private tort law,
provides a more appropriate analogue for doing so in the private employment context than Section 1983
or Title IX, which apply to government actors. A discussion of the deliberate indifference standard for
public entities is beyond this Article's focus on a reckless discrimination standard for private entities.
For more on the complexities of applying the deliberate indifference standard to claims of discrimination
in public education, see, for example, Deborah L. Brake, School Liability for Peer Sexual Harassment
After Davis: Shifting From Intent to Causation in Discrimination Law, 12 Hastings Women's L.J. 5
(2001); Paul M. Secunda, Overcoming Deliberate Indifference: Reconsidering Effective Legal
Protections for Bullied Special Education Students, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 175 (2015).
356. See supra Part III.A.3.
357. Among the cases tortifying antidiscrimination law, the entire concept of recklessness is
mentioned only once in passing: In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Court notes that "[i]ntentional torts
such as this [action under USERRA], 'as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts,... generally
require that the actor intend the consequences of an act,' not simply 'the act itself.' 562 U.S. 411, 417
(2011) (quoting Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1998)) (internal modifications and quotation
marks omitted) (bankruptcy case). This fleeting reference to a "reckless" tort does not, this Article
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Despite potential criticisms, however, theorizing a recklessness model adds
a new tool to the toolshed that builds incrementally upon many legal scholars'
attempts to theorize liability under Title VII for structural discrimination and the
operation of implicit bias at work. Where courts have limited Oppenheimer's
negligence framework from reaching intentional disparate treatment,358 a
recklessness model bridges the gap between an employer's mere failure to meet
a duty to prevent discrimination and its volitional behavior that fosters
discrimination-the latter being closer to "intent" under Title VII. Where
Krieger and her colleagues' vicarious social framework model has been cabined
by resistance to holding employer entities responsible for seemingly individual
biases, 359 a recklessness model takes the individual decision maker out of the
equation. Where Green's organizational context model articulated the
importance of holding employer entities directly liable for work cultures and
systems that foster implicit bias and stereotyping, recklessness provides an
additional legal tool for doing so. 3 6 0
It is time to incorporate what we know about the science of bias into the
doctrine of Title VII. An employer entity that knows about the risks of implicit
bias, has evidence that such bias may be infecting its decision-making structures,
and fails to act to prevent it is acting so recklessly that a court can infer its
discriminatory intent.
contends, foreclose the possibility that recklessness could satisfy the intent required to for intentional
disparate treatment under Title VII.
358. See supra Part l.C.
359. See supra Part I.A.
360. See supra Part I.B.
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